The political economy of violence: the case of Venezuela by Leon, Daniel Simon
American University in Cairo 
AUC Knowledge Fountain 
Theses and Dissertations 
6-1-2010 
The political economy of violence: the case of Venezuela 
Daniel Simon Leon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds 
Recommended Citation 
APA Citation 
Leon, D. (2010).The political economy of violence: the case of Venezuela [Master’s thesis, the American 
University in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain. 
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/1057 
MLA Citation 
Leon, Daniel Simon. The political economy of violence: the case of Venezuela. 2010. American University 
in Cairo, Master's thesis. AUC Knowledge Fountain. 
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/1057 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by AUC Knowledge Fountain. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AUC Knowledge Fountain. For more 
information, please contact mark.muehlhaeusler@aucegypt.edu. 
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO 
SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF VIOLENCE: THE CASE OF VENEZUELA 
 
DANIEL SIMON LEON 
 
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 
 
May, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ii 
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF VIOLENCE: THE CASE OF VENEZUELA 
A THESIS SUBMITTED BY 
DANIEL SIMON LEON 
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
May, 2010 
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF 
MASTER OF ARTS 
HAS BEEN APPROVED BY  
 
Dr. Dan Tschirgi 
Thesis Committee Advisor--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Affiliation: --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Dr. Ibrahim El Nur 
Thesis Reader ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Affiliation: --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Dr. Ninette Fahmy 
Thesis Reader ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Affiliation: --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
-----------------  --------------    -------------------- -------------- 
Department Chair Date    Dean of HUSS  Date  
 
  iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter I: Introduction     1 
 
Chapter II: The Economic Context of    16 
Venezuela’s Developmental Path  
   
 1) Oil and Development    16 
 
 2) Economic Liberalization    27 
  
Chapter III: The Social and Political Contexts  30 
of Venezuela’s Developmental Path 
 
 1) Institutional Dynamics    30 
 
 2) Urbanization     38 
 
 3) The Socio-Political Crisis    40 
 
Chapter IV: Case Study # 1: Venezuela   47 
 
 1) Its Good to be Rich! The Origins of   47 
     Oil-Based Development 
   
 2) Inflated Economy, Deflated Productivity  58 
     and Chaotic Urbanization 
 
 3) Economic Reform and Political Revolution 64 
 
 4) The Worsening of Political and Economic 76 
     Variables and the Rise of Violence 
     
Chapter VI: Conclusion     98 
 
 1) Policy Recommendations    109 
 
Bibliography       119 
    
Appendix A        125 
 
 
 
  iv 
GRAPHS AND TABLES 
GRAPHS 
1) Correlation Between the Rule of Law    32 
and Natural Resource Exports  
 
2) Annual Inflation and Unemployment    61 
Averages in Venezuela    
 
3) Homicide Rate per 100,000 Inhabitants    72 
In Venezuela from 1983 to 2003   
 
4) In the Rollercoaster of the Barrel     80 
from 1971 to 2009    
 
5) The Misery Index and Violence    83 
in Venezuela from 1983 to 2009 
  
 
TABLES 
1) Rentier States 1972-1999     8 
2) Growth Trends in the Venezuelan Economy   60 
1920-2002  
 
3) Gross Fixed Investment Rates, Venezuela,  70 
1950 to 1998 
 
DIAGRAM 
 
1) The Interaction of Variables and Events   108 
that Produced Social Violence in Venezuela 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  v 
Abstract 
 This thesis will attempt to answer the question of how can the rise in social 
violence be explained in the oil-rich nation of Venezuela since the 1980s? The once 
relatively peaceful nation of Venezuela has seen a dramatic rise in social violence over 
the last three decades that has placed her amongst some of the world’s most dangerous 
countries. A review of the relevant literature will reveal that the study of a social 
phenomenon such as violence, and in a nation such as Venezuela, is a complicated task 
because there are a number of different but in many cases interlinked variables that 
contribute to the formation of this social phenomenon. Therefore the conceptual 
framework will consist of a multi-variable analysis so that this study may go about to 
formulate an appropriate explanation based on the complex causes and effects that 
surround this issue. However, special attention will be given to the nation’s 
developmental history has given way to a severe socio-political crisis. But although 
special attention will be given to this important variable, no hierarchy of variables will be 
established as the convoluted nature of social events makes it very difficult to formulate 
one. Other factors that will also be analyzed as they contribute to the rise of social 
violence are: the nation’s vast hydrocarbon wealth (which is always an outstanding 
variable because of its economic importance), economic reform and liberalization, and 
the urbanization process. Although there have been several studies on oil-rich nations 
(including Venezuela), their economic dynamics, the Latin American urbanization 
process, and the Venezuelan political crisis, there is an absence of studies that include 
these intervening factors in a comprehensive manner. This thesis hopes to fill this gap. 
 
  vi 
Prologue 
Venezuela is a country with 200 years of independent history but with a 
democratic history that begins in 1958 when General Marcos Perez Jimenez, dictator of 
the country, goes into exile due to the mounting public pressure for the democratization 
of the country. That same year a congress takes place where the future democratic leaders 
of the country that helped to topple the dictatorship come together to agree on the 
foundations for the new democratic regime. The result of the congress came to be known 
as the Pact of Punto Fijo, after the city where it took place. The new framework was 
based on Pactismo (pact-making), where the two main political parties, the Social 
Democrats (Acción Democratica) and the Social Christians (COPEI), agreed on a 
pluralistic consensus-building system that would maintain a democratic regime1.  
The pact-making system gave way to a seemingly stable democratic political 
system in Venezuela. It was tested during the years of the following the first oil boom in 
1973. The political system seemed to be holding on and channeling the new incoming 
wealth since it gave way to high growth rates, which even reached world records at some 
points in time, and an accelerated increase in the standards of livings2. But the 
Venezuelan honeymoon with high growth rates and a stable democratic regime came to 
an end at the end of the 1980s when the mounting social and economic pressures from 
                                                        1 Karl, Terry L. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. University of California 
Press. Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1997. P. 93; Mollejas, Luis Meta. Los Limites de la 
Revolución: Petróleo y Gobernabilidad (The Limits of the Revolution: Petroleum and 
Governability). School of Social and Economic Sciences. Central University of Venezuela Press. 
Caracas. 2006. P. 13. 2  Naim, Moises and Ramon Piñango. El Caso Venezuela: Una Ilusión de Armonia (The Case of 
Venezuela: An Illusion of Harmony). Ediciones IESA. 2nd Edition. Caracas. 1985. P. 542. 
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mounting public debt, an unproductive non-oil sector, and the inability of the state to 
solve problems through petro-dollars sees the nation’s capital erupt in social unrest and 
violence3.  
After the events of the late 1980s in Venezuela, the nation has steadily witnessed 
the murder rates increase every year. This social challenge has grown to become the 
Venezuelan people’s number one concern4. Along side the murder rate, another social 
factor that increased was poverty and inequality5. It is notable that the majority of the 
impoverished population has concentrated in the peripheries of the urban areas. In 1992 
one of the world’s costliest bank – caused by a poorly implemented structural adjustment 
program that undermined state capacities - increased the country’s socio-economic 
problems6. These social pressures have grown alongside an ailing political system. 
The Venezuelan democratic pact-making system was seen as a rare and 
exceptional occurrence. This political system collapsed in 1994 after its consensus-
building institutions (the traditional political parties) failed to win that year’s presidential 
elections and failed to agree on a platform to address the dire socio-economic woes of the 
nation. Due to the precarious socio-economic situation that impoverished the country,                                                         3 Karl, Terry L. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. University of California 
Press. Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1997. P. 180-181. 4 International Crisis Group. “Venezuela: Accelerating the Bolivarian revolution.” Latin America 
Briefing No 22. Bogotá and Brussels. November 5. 2009. P. 6. 5 Lopez Maya, Margarita. “Venezuela 2001-2004: Actores y Estrategias en la Lucha Hegemónica 
(Venezuela 2001-2004: Actors and Strategies in the Hegemonic Struggle).” Lateinamerika. 
Analysen und Berichte. Spanish version. 2004. P. 27. 
 6  DiJohn, Jonathan. “Economic Liberalization, Political Instability, and State Capacity in 
Venezuela.” International Political Science Review. Vol. 26 No. 1. 2005. P. 113. 
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steadily rising levels of social violence and a severe political crisis the presidential 
elections of 1998 were filled with great uncertainty. The elections resulted in the victory 
of a candidate, armed with a radical but populist rhetoric, that vowed to act against the 
previous neo-liberal and the soc called “oligarchy” (meaning the middle and upper 
classes) that were seen by the popular masses – that accepted the message – as the 
culprits for their ill situation7. The politico-economic crisis and the high levels of social 
violence of Venezuela continue to this day with no apparent end in sight.
                                                        7 Mollejas, Luis Meta. Los Limites de la Revolución: Petróleo y Gobernabilidad (The Limits of 
the Revolution: Petroleum and Governability). School of Social and Economic Sciences. Central 
University of Venezuela Press. Caracas. 2006. P. 16. 
  1 
CHAPTER I: 
INTRODUCTION 
 “When societies enter into crises, this almost inevitably raises the great 
necessity of what another author called “terrible simplifications.” But of 
course, the “terrible simplifiers” also arise, who become the bearers of 
the recipes, formulas, and beliefs that promise to solve the problems 
affecting society (original in Spanish).” 
Moises Naim and Ramon Piñango8. 
 The case of Venezuela is one that has been simplified and even dismissed too 
many times from academic and political discussions. It has been referred as an 
“exceptional case” since for the better part of the second half of the 20th century saw 
Venezuela as a progressive and democratic regime with a relatively peaceful internal 
environment while its other oil-producing counterparts exhibited autocratic and 
sometimes violent regimes9. More recently, Venezuela has been branded as one of the 
leading nations opposing the neo-liberal world order, a country that seems to have stood 
up against globalization10. This is because the executive administration that was elected 
in 1998 has been noted for its strong anti-neo-liberal rhetoric and actions such as the 
reversal of privatization endeavors11. But these interpretations are the erroneous and                                                         8 Naim, Moises and Ramon Piñango. El Caso Venezuela: Una Ilusión de Armonia (The Case of 
Venezuela: An Illusion of Harmony). Ediciones IESA. 2nd Edition. Caracas. 1985. P. xv. 
 9 Karl, Terry L. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. University of California 
Press. Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1997. P. 21. 10 Naim, Moises. “The Real Story Behind Venezuela’s Woes.” Journal of Democracy. Vol 12 No 
2. April. 2001. P. 17. 11 DiJohn, Jonathan. “The Political Economy of Anti-Politics and Social Polarization in 
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sometimes dangerous result of the “terrible simplifications” by the individuals who 
provide uncomplicated and unelaborated formulas as explanations and solutions to 
phenomena that are in actuality very complex12.  
 The case of Venezuela has been misread and significantly understudied by the 
international academic community who felt that it was too boring. The Venezuelan 
experience has lacked the sensationalist features that characterize cases – found in 
conflict-ridden areas like the Middle East or in Africa. In their opinion these cases may 
not only satisfy genuine academic curiosity but the marketing potential for publication 
which are widely sought after features in the world of academia13. It is safe to say that the 
academic lure was applicable to journalists, which distracted them from the events in 
Latin America. Francis Fukuyama mentions for example that back in 1971, Richard 
Nixon advised the young Donald Rumsfeld that: “Latin America doesn't matter… People 
don't give one damn about Latin America now.’ Rumsfeld took Nixon's advice on where 
to focus his career, and the rest is history”14. But the reality is much different.  
 The Venezuelan experience – just like other Latin American cases and other 
developing nations around the world – cannot be explained away with simple analyses. 
This is because the Venezuelan experience is a very complex one that comprises many                                                         
Venezuela 1998-2004.” Crisis States Research Center. Working Paper no. 76. December. 2005. 
P. 5. 
 12 Naim, Moises and Ramon Piñango. El Caso Venezuela: Una Ilusión de Armonia (The Case of 
Venezuela: An Illusion of Harmony). Ediciones IESA. 2nd Edition. Caracas. 1985. P. xv. 13 Naim, Moises. “The Real Story Behind Venezuela’s Woes.” Journal of Democracy. Vol 12 No 
2. April. 2001. P. 17. P. 18. 14  Fukuyama, Francis. “A Quiet Revolution: Latin America’s Unheralded Progress.” Foreign 
Affairs. November/December. www.foreignaffairs.com (accessed on March 14, 2010). 2007. 
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different variables. No single theoretical discourse will be able to provide an adequate 
explanation for it. As Lopez-Maya (2004) indicates that, Venezuela is a complex case to 
study because it responds to a different, but interlinked, array of factors. Some of them 
are common to the region-wide Latin American experience such as its colonial legacy, 
200 years of turbulent independent history and the debt and poverty crises of the last two 
decades of the 20th century15. Some of these factors are common to the region and others 
are exclusive of the Venezuelan experience16.  
 A unique factor of the modern Venezuelan experience is the presence of high 
amount of social violence, which today constitutes the country’s most dire challenge 
according to Venezuelan public opinion17. The levels of social violence in the country 
have been steadily rising since the 1980s to the point that at the turn of the century 
Venezuela became the 6th most violent country in the world18. Even though high social 
levels of violence are present in other Latin American countries, the Venezuelan 
experience differs because its rates of violence have become comparable to the ones 
found in Colombian Republic, a nation that suffers from a 40 year-old internal conflict, 
which is not the case with Venezuela. Therefore, because of the importance and 
                                                        15 Lopez Maya, Margarita. “Venezuela 2001-2004: Actores y Estrategias en la Lucha 
Hegemónica (Venezuela 2001-2004: Actors and Strategies in the Hegemonic Struggle).” 
Lateinamerika. Analysen und Berichte. Spanish version. 2004. P. 27. 16 Ibid, 27. 17 International Crisis Group. “Venezuela: Accelerating the Bolivarian revolution.” Latin 
America Briefing No 22. Bogotá and Brussels. November 5. 2009. P. 6. 18 Naim, Moises. “The Real Story Behind Venezuela’s Woes.” Journal of Democracy. Vol 12 No 
2. April. 2001. P. 19. 
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uniqueness of this factor the main question posed by this research is: how can the rise in 
social violence be explained in the oil-rich nation of Venezuela since the 1980s?  
This high rate of violence in Venezuela has severely impacted the socio-political 
fabric. In 2006, the Venezuelan capital, Caracas, has become the number one murder 
capital of the world19. That year the murder rate in Caracas was 136 inhabitants per 
100,000. This is far ahead, well over twice the rate, of even the second most murderous 
capital in the world at the time, South Africa’s Cape Town with 62 murders per 100,000 
inhabitants.20 When the national murder rate per 100,000 inhabitants is examined, the 
overall national number is lower than that of the specific rate found in the capital, 
peaking in 2003 to 50. But it is still an extremely high murder rate that becomes 
comparable to the Colombian murder rate, a country that is suffering from a four-decade 
armed internal conflict21. This study has merit because it explores the very brutal effects 
of a convoluted developmental history and the impact of misplaced developmental 
strategies that this nation embarked on. Because of the complex nature of the Venezuelan 
developmental history, the literature will be examined somewhat eclectically in order to 
set a theoretical background that will attempt to explain the rise in social violence. Also, 
                                                        19 In this study, the murder rate per 100,000 inhabitants will be used as the means to quantify the 
effects of the socio-political violence in the case study of Venezuela since it, like no other 
statistic, can portray in a simple and accurate way the impact and suffering that violence has on 
society. It only comprises violent and criminal acts that result in an individual’s death. It is not 
limited to any single time of violence (i.e. political violence or domestic violence). 20 Wigmore, Barry. “Caracas Tops List of Murder Capitals of the World.” Mail Online, World 
News. http://www.dailymail.co.uk (Accessed on March 13, 2009 and Published on September 
30th 2008). 2008. 21 Briceño-Leon, Roberto.. “Violence in Venezuela: Oil Rent and Political Crisis.” Ciência & 
Saude Colectiva. Vol. 11 No. 2. April/June. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 2006. P. 316. 
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it is important to start by explain the economic context in which events have developed 
since the fourth quarter of the 20th century. 
A unique feature of the Venezuelan experience, the dynamics of its vast oil wealth, 
always gets analytical priority in the studies that examine this country because of its 
significance and influence to the politico-economic dynamics, and this thesis is no 
exception. Countries that possess an insignificant endowment of natural resources, such 
as the repeatedly hailed cases of the Asian Tigers, have performed incredibly better in 
terms of economic and even political development than the resource-rich ones22. The 
same outcome appears to have materialized in the oil economy of Venezuela. The nirvana 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, which grows only because of the rise in 
consumption and public expenditure, and which lasts only until the price of oil busts, is a 
dangerous attraction for developing countries23. The oil price bust, by itself, does not 
seem to create a tangible detrimental effect on society. This is because society is affected 
not so much by the reduction of hydrocarbon revenues but by the economy’s inability to 
replace those revenues with other revenues from the non-oil sectors, manufacturing and 
agriculture. These sectors’ productivity has been diminished by the economic effect 
known as the “Dutch disease.” This economic effect results from the heavy use of 
mineral revenues that en up in “fostering an insufficient degree of diversification and 
                                                        
22 Humphreys, Macartan, J.D. Sachs and J.E. Stiglitz Eds. Escaping the Resource Curse. 
Columbia University Press. New York. 2007. P. 1. 23 Auty, Richard and Raymond Mikesell. Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies. Oxford 
University Press, New York. 1998. P. 29. 
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vulnerability towards external shocks”24. This is because the state is generating vast 
amounts of its income from abroad, which is used to finance public endeavors, and it is in 
a position to neglect domestic production. In other words, with mineral revenues it 
becomes logically easier to allocate the externally generated mineral revenue than 
generating revenue from domestic production25. This thesis will explore the effects that 
oil wealth has on in Venezuela – it will also explain that mineral wealth has had an 
important, but not a sole, role in helping to generate the high levels of socio-political 
violence that have marked Venezuela since 1980’s. 
 The main theoretical discourse specifically dealing with the economic dynamics 
of petro-states have been the rentier state theory and the resource curse thesis. The rentier 
state theory explains that oil revenues have a stabilizing effect on authoritarian regimes 
through fostering clientelist networks of patronage. This theory has been applied in 
various empirical studies of Middle Eastern petro-states26. But this theory does not 
adequately explain the Venezuelan case since the empirical and theoretical findings that 
sustain the theory in the Middle East do not hold in the Latin American nation. In 
Venezuela, rentierism did not stabilize the democratic pact-making system that existed in 
the nation since 1958, since it collapsed in 1994, but rather produces the opposite result 
                                                        24 Mähler, Annegret. “Oil In Venezuela: Triggering Violence or Ensuring Stability? A Context-
sensitive Analysis of Ambivalent Impact of Resource Abundance.” German Institute of Global 
and Area Studies (GIGA). Working Papers no 112. October. 2009. P. 7. 25 Luciani, Gicomo. “Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework.” Eds. Luciani, 
Giacomo and Hafez Beblawi. The Rentier State. Instituto Affari Internazionali. Beckenham and 
New York. P. 63 – 82. 1987. P. 69. 26 Mähler, Annegret. “Oil In Venezuela: Triggering Violence or Ensuring Stability? 2009. P. 7. 
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that aided in increasing the country’s violence27. This does not disprove the rentier state 
theory, but just makes it less applicable outside the Middle Eastern socio-historical 
context.  
 The resource curse thesis offers a somewhat divergent explanation to the 
workings of the petro-state than the rentier state theory. It argues that when oil rents are 
used as the main or one of the main driving forces for the economy, the non-oil 
productive sector is significantly reduced – through the already mentioned process known 
as the Dutch disease – thus not encouraging the diversification of the economy and 
making it vulnerable to external shocks28. The resource curse thesis along with the rentier 
state theory – overall meaning oil-based development – are one of the thesis’ hypothesis 
since they aid in explaining Venezuela’s heavy economic woes of the late 1980’s and 
1990’s which helped violence to increase by creating a detrimental socio-economic 
situation. But in the end these paradigms cannot fully account for other contextual factors 
that affected the nation and the phenomenon of social violence.  
 
 
 
                                                        27 Cyr, Jennifer. “Examining the Evidence of Social Polarization: Venezuelan Society Before and 
After Chavez.” Florida International University. Latin American and Caribbean Center. Working 
Paper Series no. 11. August. 2005. P. 4; Naim, Moises. “The Real Story Behind Venezuela’s 
Woes.” Journal of Democracy. Vol 12 No 2. April. 2001. P. 17-18. 
 28 Mähler, Annegret. “Oil In Venezuela: Triggering Violence or Ensuring Stability? A Context-
sensitive Analysis of Ambivalent Impact of Resource Abundance.” German Institute of Global 
and Area Studies (GIGA). Working Papers no 112. October. 2009. P. 7. 
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Table 1: Rentier States 1972-199929 
 
 In Venezuela oil constitutes 90 percent of export earnings, 50 per cent of budget 
revenues, and 30 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP)30. This places the country 
as an economically typical rentierist state, which is an important factor in explaining the                                                         29 Herb, Michael. “No representation Without Taxation? Rents, Development, and Democracy.” 
Comparative Politics. Vol. 37 No. 3. April. 2005. P. 299. For the percentage value of rentierism, 
Herb uses Beblawi’s (1987) definition that a rentier state’s budget revenues should be comprised 
of at least 40 per cent by mineral income. 
 
30 CIA World Factbook. “Venezuela.” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ve.html (Accessed March 26, 2010). 2009. 
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country’s woes. But in order to explain rise in social violence it is important to show the 
socio-historical of country’s development. First of all, Venezuela had an illiberal politico-
economic framework at the time, and subsequently of the first oil boom in 1973. 
Venezuelan policymakers sought to “seed the petroleum,” which means that oil revenues 
would be used to fund developmental projects. But because of the policymakers’ illiberal 
economic framework the chosen development endeavors were based on the concept of 
import substitution that significantly dislodged Venezuela from the international 
market31. This would aid in rendering the non-oil economy unproductive and help to 
intensify the effects of the Dutch disease.  
 In Venezuela, socio-economic pressures arose from the collapse of oil prices in 
the 1980s. This was because the economy’s main driving force, oil revenues, lost its 
propelling force which allowed poverty to rise and the government was unable to offset 
this event with popular subsidies since the nation’s budget deficit reached 9.9 per cent of 
GDP in 198832.  Social pressures reached their boiling points in 1989. This year, social 
unrest grew to the point where it manifested itself in the form of violent riots and clashes 
with governmental security forces in the capital city. This event came to be known as El 
Caracazo, which was a violent social response to the structural adjustment program that 
attempted to salvage the economy by implementing austerity programs that severely 
reduced subsidies. This reduction of subsidies particularly affected the transportation                                                         31 Mollejas, Luis Meta. Los Limites de la Revolución: Petróleo y Gobernabilidad (The Limits of 
the Revolution: Petroleum and Governability). School of Social and Economic Sciences. Central 
University of Venezuela Press. Caracas. 2006. P. 7. 32 DiJohn, Jonathan. “Economic Liberalization, Political Instability, and State Capacity in 
Venezuela.” International Political Science Review. Vol. 26 No. 1. 2005. P. 110. 
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sector because the price of gasoline was doubled33. The rise of gasoline prices had a 
severe effect in the Venezuelan psyche because its historical low prices have become 
extremely popular and their increase is a definite “third rail” political issue.  
 The literature dealing with the effects economic reform, or structural adjustment, 
implemented after 1989 has also helped to explain the socio-economic woes that the 
country has suffered. It is linked to the rise in violence because of the detrimental social 
effects that it produced such as the rise in poverty. Economic reform is another 
hypothesis explaining the rise of social violence as it reduced state capacities and failed 
to revive the private sector so that it could take over former public socio-economic 
endeavors such as job creation that would prevent the deterioration of the socio-economic 
situation34. This paradigm, although important, can also not be examined alone in order to 
explain the rise of violence. This is because there are other factors that aided in 
generating a detrimental socio-economic situation that has induced social violence. 
 Before further analysis is given of the context and variables that explain the rise 
of social violence in Venezuela, this case study has to be briefly compared to other states 
that share its rentier characteristic. When examining rentier states, and especially when 
they are compared, such as with the case of Venezuela (refer to Table 1) two important 
observations can be made. First, petro states must be divided into two categories, the 
extreme rentierist states (such as the Arabian peninsula states, commonly refer to as the 
                                                        33 Karl, Terry L. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. University of California 
Press. Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1997. P. 180. 34 DiJohn, Jonathan. “Economic Liberalization, Political Instability, and State Capacity in 
Venezuela.” International Political Science Review. Vol. 26 No. 1. 2005. P. 108. 
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Gulf states) and the other rentier states whose economies exhibit a high but not a 
complete dependence on mineral revenues. This distinction is important because one 
group is hardly comparable to the other group. This is because states that do not exhibit 
extreme rentierism are clearly still generating significant amounts of revenues from the 
non-hydrocarbon economy, which makes its socio-economic dynamics much more 
complex and vibrant. Adding to this context is once again population. Extreme rentier 
states are mostly comprised of relatively small populations, while non-extreme rentier 
states have sizable populations. This allows for very meaningful non-oil socio-economic 
dynamics to exist even though governmental revenues may still be dominated by oil 
revenues and are subject to different and often much more complex socio-economic 
dynamics. Not only are the economic dynamics more complex but also the social 
dynamics are much more convoluted and vibrant in non-extreme rentier states, which is 
definitely the case in Venezuela. This is because hydrocarbons have represented an 
average about 60 per cent of budget revenues (refer to table 1) and about one third of 
GDP. The rest of the economy is overwhelmingly occupied by the service sector, with a 
small contribution by non-oil industries and agriculture35. Therefore, the complexity and 
dynamism of the Venezuelan case makes the study of the social and political context as 
necessary as with the economic context. 
  Besides the economic factors that have influenced the Venezuelan case, one 
element that has severely influenced it is the dynamics of population growth and 
urbanization. The nation’s population has more than doubled since the first oil boom in                                                         35  CIA World Factbook. “Venezuela.” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ve.html (Accessed March 26, 2010). 2009. 
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1973 when it stood at 12 million and now stands at over 26 million36. Population 
pressures significantly increased the demand for job creation, which a non-liberal 
economy could not supply. The effects of the population boom have to be examined 
along with the country’s urbanization process. Venezuela saw in the 20th century a heavy 
and rapid urbanization process that can be categorized as a rural-urban exodus. This 
process happened under the banner of modernization and industrialization that inherently 
carried with it the promise of ever-improving goods, services and standard of living. But 
the new generations of urban-born migrants did not see the promise of continually 
improving living conditions realized.  
 The urbanization process in Venezuela creates a mismatch between the precarious 
socio-economic condition and the expectation of continually modernizing standard of 
living. Furthermore, the fast, unorganized, and unregulated urbanization process eroded 
the social control mechanism of the new generations, which regulated the social 
interactions of their once rural home, and was unable to prevent the rise of violent men37. 
Therefore, the urbanization process is a hypothesis that further explains the increases in 
social violence since it has significantly contributed to increasing poverty and eroded 
institutions of social control that directly aid in preventing violence. This important 
paradigm becomes even more important when examining the country’s particular socio-
political variable.  
                                                        
36 Karl, Terry L. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. University of California 
Press. Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1997. P. 4. 37 Briceño-Leon, Roberto. “Violencia y Desesperanza: La Otra Crisis Social de America Latina 
(Violence and Hopelessness: The Other Social Crisis of Latin America).” Nueva Sociedad. 1999. 
P. 125. 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 Some socio-political factors such as the political crisis that triggered the political 
promotion of social resentment, which are endogenous to the Venezuelan experience, are 
able to fill the explanatory gap left by the economic-deterministic paradigms. As 
mentioned before, the rentier status of the Venezuelan government – and the clientelistic 
networks that accompanied it – was not able to prevent the collapse of the party-led pact-
making system that preserved the democratic system from 1958 until its collapse in 1994 
with the election of Rafael Caldera. This was because the presidential reelection of Rafael 
Caldera came about without the support of, or consensus, of any of the traditional parties 
that integrated the pact of Punto Fijo38. This ushers Venezuela into a seemingly 
irreversible political crisis.  
 The institutional void that was left by the Venezuelan political crisis came to be 
filled in 1999 by a new hyper-personalistic government, constituted by former military 
officers and far-left activists that showed little regard for democratic institutions. Even so, 
they ascended to power with the support of the marginalized and impoverished urban 
population39. They have maintained this popular support by the institutionalization of 
social resentment amongst the marginalized urban population towards the more affluent 
sectors of the urban sphere. The post-1999 regime has done so by applying an anti-
politics rhetoric that blames the nation’s economic woes on the structural adjustment 
                                                        38 Lopez Maya, Margarita. “Venezuela 2001-2004: Actores y Estrategias en la Lucha 
Hegemónica (Venezuela 2001-2004: Actors and Strategies in the Hegemonic Struggle).” 
Lateinamerika. Analysen und Berichte. Spanish version. 2004. 27-28. 
 39 Mollejas, Luis Meta. Los Limites de la Revolución: Petróleo y Gobernabilidad (The Limits of 
the Revolution: Petroleum and Governability). School of Social and Economic Sciences. Central 
University of Venezuela Press. Caracas. 2006. P.16. 
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programs enacted by the previous administrations40. Also, they have exploited the widely 
held popular belief that Venezuela is a very rich country – due to its hydrocarbon 
potential – and that it the previous governmental oligarchy, which is comprised of middle 
and upper class individuals, is the real culprits in literally stealing the nation’s wealth and 
the popular expectation for modernization41. The urban middle and upper classes 
demographically compose the majority of the Chavez’ political opposition42. Therefore, 
this thesis’ final hypothesis is that the post-1999 administration – a result of the nation’s 
political crisis – by tapping into the marginalized poor’s social resentment, social 
violence is encouraged, and even legitimized because of the governmental discourse that 
“they” (the middle and upper classes) are the reason that “we” (the urban poor) are in 
an impoverished condition43. These paradigms and their relation to other paradigms will 
be explored further in the following chapters. 
 Before moving any further it is important to note the methodology that will be 
used to explain the rise of social violence in Venezuela since the 1980s. As noted, in 
order to explain the dynamics of a particular phenomenon – whether it is social violence 
or other socio economic consequence - in a country such as Venezuela a multi-variable 
approach must be followed in order to avoid any kind of simplified explanation that has                                                         40 DiJohn, Jonathan. “The Political Economy of Anti-Politics and Social Polarization in 
Venezuela 1998-2004.” Crisis States Research Center. Working Paper no. 76. December. 2005. 
P. 5. 
 41 Naim, Moises. “The Real Story Behind Venezuela’s Woes.” Journal of Democracy. Vol 12 No 
2. April. 2001. P. 20. 42 Petkoff, Teodoro. “Las dos Izquierdas (The Two Lefts).” Nueva Sociedad. Vol. 197. May-
June. 2005. P. 126. 43 Colburn, Forrest D. “Latin America: Captive to Commodities.” Dissent Magazine. Vol. 56 No. 
1. Winter. 2009. P. 30. 
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too many times plagued the analysis of events in the Latin American nation. Therefore, 
only a multi-variable analysis can explain the political economy of Venezuela, which 
may be able to explain the politico-economic factors that have allowed for the rise of 
violence in this country. However, even though several social, economic, and political 
variables will be examined no hierarchy will be mentioned or suggested between them. 
Particular emphasis has been, and will be, placed on the socio-political variable of the 
nation’s political crisis and the institutionalization of social resentment. This is because it 
is a unique variable that has had a central role in the explanation for the rise of violence. 
However, even though this is an outstanding variable it must be examined along with the 
other variables, and the contexts in which they have developed, since it is the complex 
interaction amongst them that has produced the political crisis and the rise of social 
violence in Venezuela.  
 This thesis will be comprised of a total of 5 chapters, which includes this present 
introduction. The 2nd chapter will consist of a review of Venezuela’s developmental path 
that particularly examines the economic contexts. The 3rd chapter will also examine the 
country’s developmental path but focusing on the social and political context. The 4th 
chapter will be a more in-depth case study of Venezuela that will further explain the 
complex interaction of variables that will be explained in chapter 2 and 3. Finally, the 5th 
chapter will provide of the concluding analysis based on the findings of this thesis, policy 
recommendations and further calls for research.  
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CHAPTER II: 
THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF VENEZUELA’S DEVELOPMENTAL PATH 
 Because Venezuela is a complex case any analysis of it would be poor if its 
defining characteristics are not stated and defined. Even though Venezuela shares many 
common historical and developmental experiences with its Latin American neighbors, 
there is one aspect that sets it apart from the broader regional experience. This 
characteristic is its vast oil wealth. Hydrocarbons have been used to fund developmental 
endeavors. This results from the fact that oil rents have dominated governmental 
revenues as shown in the introductory chapter. Therefore, since oil is a dominant variable 
in the economic context of Venezuela’s developmental path it will be examined first. 
Afterwards, another important variable that significantly affects Venezuela’s economic 
context after 1989, the process of economic liberalization and reform, will also be 
examined. 
 1) Oil and Development 
 First of all, it is important to define what is a mineral economy in order to 
understand the subject of the study. In quantifiable terms, a mineral economy is one 
whose mineral industry generates at least 8% of its gross domestic product (GDP) and at 
least 40% of its exports44. This quantified measure shows that a mineral economy relies 
heavily on its mineral industry to finance the endeavors of the state. Giacomo Luciani 
(1987) asserted that this overreliance could not only produce a mineral economy, but a                                                         44 Auty, Richard M. Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis. 
Routledge, New York. 1993. P. 3. 
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rentier economy if 40 per cent or more of its budget revenues are derived from oil45. This 
is of course a relative analysis. A country can have a very large mineral industry in 
absolute terms and not be a mineral economy. Only when the mineral industry of a 
country is large enough that the aforementioned industry becomes one of the primary, 
and sometimes the primary product of the national economy, is when the country 
becomes a mineral economy. It is also important to define the characteristics of a rentier 
economy. According to Hazem Beblawi (1987), there are three essential features of a 
rentier economy, “[First], rent cannot be the only kind of income in the economy, but it 
should predominate; [second], the origin of the rent must be external to the economy, as 
‘pure internal rent boils down to a situation of domestic payment transfer’; [third], a 
minority in the population must be involved in the generation of the rent, while the 
majority is involved only in the distribution or utilization of it”46. When looking at the 
economic indicators in the analysis of the rent-based development, exports are the key 
figures as the rentierism occurs when mineral endowments are used as an export industry. 
There is no evidence of rents being generated when mineral resources are used for the 
sole purpose of domestic consumption47. The Venezuelan figures that were mentioned in 
the introduction in relation to the ratio of hydrocarbons in exports, governmental revenue 
                                                        45 Luciani, Gicomo. “Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework.” Eds. Luciani, 
Giacomo and Hafez Beblawi. The Rentier State. Instituto Affari Internazionali. Beckenham and 
New York. P. 63 – 82. 1987. P. 70. 46 Luciani, Giacomo and Hazem Beblawi Eds. The Rentier State. Instituto Affari Internazionali. 
Beckenham and New York. 1987. P. 12. 47 Karl, Terry L. “Ensuring Fairness: The Case for a Transparent Fiscal Social Contract.” Eds. 
Humphreys, Macartan, J.D. Sachs and J.E. Stiglitz. Escaping the Resource Curse. Columbia 
University Press. New York. 256-286. 2007. P. 257; Luciani, Giacomo and Hazem Beblawi Eds. 
The Rentier State. Instituto Affari Internazionali. Beckenham and New York. 1987. P. 12. 
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and GDP well exceed the quantitative requirements to be classified as a mineral economy 
and a rentier economy. 
 Oil, or petroleum, has become an essential part of modern society. Not only 
because it fuels our primary means of transportation, but also because it provides other 
important products such as paint, rubber, and plastic. Owing to its importance, oil became 
the largest internationally traded commodity in the 1960s displacing coffee as the number 
one position48. This rise in trade of oil was generated by the increasing demand for this 
precious commodity, which became necessary for the functioning of human society and 
the rise of the standards of living around the world. The importance of oil was also by the 
shortage of supply that resulted from conflicts in the Middle East, and the Iranian 
Revolution and, especially, by the formation of the oil-based economic cartel called the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). These events generated a large 
oil price-boom in the early 1970s. There has been a misconception that the oil consuming 
countries were the losers during the oil boom of the 1970’s. It was assumed that oil-
consuming countries were the ones with the burden of paying high prices for the 
commodity. However, in reality the countries whose economies suffer the most were the 
oil exporters since they had to bear the ill socio-economic effects produced by the oil-led 
economy49. Just because the treasuries of the oil exporters were being filled at very high 
rates does not necessarily imply that these nations were exhibiting real growth and 
sustainable socio-economic development. As Gelb (1988) explains, the oil exporters                                                         48 Gelb, Alan and Associates. Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse? Published for the World Bank by 
Oxford University Press. Washington D.C. 1988. P. 3. 
49 Ibid, 4. 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engaged in a “negative-sum game of monstrous proportions”50. The reason that the 
mineral economies were engaged in a negative-sum game is because they used their 
revenues to engage in rent-seeking behavior that stagnated growth in mineral exporting 
countries like Venezuela by relying on external oil revenues instead of domestic 
production51. The hydrocarbon sector grew tremendously at the expense of the non-
hydrocarbon economy. Hence oil countries chose to increase productive investment in 
one sector, hydrocarbon industry, by reducing productive investment in another. 
 Due to the great importance and impact that oil has on the international economy, 
and more importantly in the oil exporters, the rentier state theory becomes a very 
powerful framework with which one may be able to explain the many woes that a petro-
state may exhibit. It does not only claim to explain the endurance of economic woes but 
also of political and social woes. The rentier state theory has been used to explain the 
rise, and most importantly, the stability of authoritarian regimes because the state society 
linkage is broken when mineral rents replace the citizen’s tributary contributions to the 
governmental revenue52. Since these mineral resources are under the sovereign 
jurisdiction of the state, it is this entity that is accountable for the policies that are taken to 
manage the oil wealth. According to the rentier state theory set forth by Luciani (1987), 
                                                        
50 Gelb, Alan and Associates. Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse? Published for the World Bank by 
Oxford University Press. Washington D.C. 1988. P. 5. 51 Luciani, Gicomo. “Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework.” Eds. Luciani, 
Giacomo and Hafez Beblawi. The Rentier State. Instituto Affari Internazionali. Beckenham and 
New York. P. 63 – 82. 1987. P. 69. 52 Mähler, Annegret. “Oil In Venezuela: Triggering Violence or Ensuring Stability? A Context-
sensitive Analysis of Ambivalent Impact of Resource Abundance.” German Institute of Global 
and Area Studies (GIGA). Working Papers no 112. October. 2009. P. 7. 
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the linkage between the state and civil society is broken since the state does not need to 
rely on the societal production for its revenues, in other words, taxes53.  
 Since the state-society link is broken by the oil rents, the state’s relation to society 
is reduced to principally the allocation of rents54. This should provide an explanation to 
why a negative sum game ensues, since domestic production is no longer a major concern 
for the rent-seeking state. Its socio-political applications are also almost universally 
confirmed but only within the region of its inception, the Middle East. This is why such 
an explanation has its critics. Gwenn Okruhlik (1999) has challenged the validity of the 
rentier framework to explain politico-economic phenomena in rentier states by examining 
the emergence of political opposition in these nations. She explains that,  
“Money does not spend itself. Those acting in the name of the state make 
decisions, and the nature of the regime influences them. The rentier 
framework has proven inadequate in elucidating the rise of dissent because 
it reifies the state and overemphasizes state resources and autonomy from 
the social consequences of expenditures…[rent] is distributed inequitably  
(given in abundance to some and withheld from others)”55. She further 
explains that, “The determining variable in the creation and convergence 
of opposition is the choices of a personal regime in distributing money 
                                                        53 Luciani, Gicomo. “Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework.” Eds. Luciani, 
Giacomo and Hafez Beblawi. The Rentier State. Instituto Affari Internazionali. Beckenham and 
New York. P. 63 – 82. 1987. P. 69. 54 Ibid, 70. 55 Okruhlik, Gwenn. “Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise of Opposition: The Political 
Economy of Oil States.” Comparative Politics. Vol. 31 No. 3. April. 1999. P. 297. 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inequitably for political reasons, not rent”56. 
Therefore, the economic public policy that enshrined the economic rationality for the 
management of the new incoming revenue cannot be separated from the political 
rationale, which means that political decision-making plays a critical part in the making 
of economic policies and hence in distributing rents57. Furthermore, the rentier state 
theory has an obvious explanatory weakness when it is applied outside the Middle East to 
such as the Venezuelan case. It may help to explain the economic woes of the 
Venezuelan case but not the socio-political factors as its political regimes have been 
highly unstable – and in the case of the pact-making regime – established in 1958 and 
collapsed in 1994 – that is within the country’s rentier period58. Because of these reasons, 
the rentier state theory is inadequate as the predominant theoretical framework in the 
Venezuelan case. Besides the rentier state theory, there is another theoretical paradigm 
that is used in explaining phenomena occurring in resource rich nations. It is the resource 
curse thesis. 
 The nature of the politico-economic problem when states take and spend 
hydrocarbon rents is that those rents have been produced from nothing. Although the 
process of extracting the mineral resources and even refining them for commercial use 
can be rather complicated and sophisticated, the product is normally traded in a                                                         56 Okruhlik, Gwenn. “Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise of Opposition: The Political 
Economy of Oil States.” Comparative Politics. Vol. 31 No. 3. April. 1999. P. 308. 57 Karl, Terry L. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. University of California 
Press. Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1997. P.15. 58 Lopez Maya, Margarita. “Venezuela 2001-2004: Actores y Estrategias en la Lucha 
Hegemónica (Venezuela 2001-2004: Actors and Strategies in the Hegemonic Struggle).” 
Lateinamerika. Analysen und Berichte. Spanish version. 2004. P. 27-28. 
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composition that is very similar to the one that was found naturally. Therefore, it falls in 
the strange economic category of products that are not produced. This is because 
hydrocarbons are extracted and exported in their original composition59. Thus, no human 
labor was used to produce it unlike other real products such as a car or a mechanical tool. 
As the wise and enlightened father of modern economics, Adam Smith (1776), eloquently 
affirmed, “[Rents are] the income of men who love to reap where they never sowed”60.  
 Hydrocarbon revenues are not tied to any productive factor but just to the 
fortunate configuration of supply and demand at one point in time that yields high rents. 
Petroleum is also a product that is largely unimportant in its original configuration. 
Therefore, its only importance and focus for the exporting country is its revenues61. 
Another important attribute of mineral resources and its rents, which affects its economic 
dynamic, is that since it is non-renewable it is not a continuous and renewable source of 
income but an asset. This is because a real source of income will permanently generate 
revenues as long as its productivity continues. Minerals are therefore an asset since their 
ability to raise revenues will permanently cease when they are depleted62. The economic 
dynamics of mineral resources are often neglected, as we will see below, and this causes 
various detrimental effects to the nation’s economy.                                                          59  Humphreys, Macartan, J.D. Sachs and J.E. Stiglitz Eds. Escaping the Resource Curse. 
Columbia University Press. New York. 2007. P. 4. 
60 Quoted in Karl, Terry L. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. University of 
California Press. Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1997. P. 5. 61 Luciani, Gicomo. “Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework.” Eds. Luciani, 
Giacomo and Hafez Beblawi. The Rentier State. Instituto Affari Internazionali. Beckenham and 
New York. P. 63 – 82. 1987. P. 67. 62 Humphreys et al. Escaping the Resource Curse. 2007. P 4. 
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 At the heart of the resource curse thesis lies the economic phenomenon termed the 
“Dutch disease.” The Dutch disease takes place when mineral rents are injected into the 
economy at a very fast pace, which is what occurs during a price boom as the exchange 
rate becomes heavily appreciated in real terms63. This generates the worst effect that the 
Dutch disease is able to render; the international competitiveness of the non-mining 
industries is completely destroyed64. The result of this is that internal revenues – and the 
economy as a whole – become largely dependant upon the mining industry and its 
international revenues in order to maintain a favorable balance of payments so that the 
domestic market can import the products that it does not manufacture, or does not 
manufacture effectively, or can no longer manufacture due to the Dutch Disease. Besides 
this, the economic decline that a country will suffer from the basic ills that were brought 
by the Dutch disease and these will tend to be aggravated by the subsequent policy 
choices. 
 The Dutch disease will create an atmosphere that favors protectionism. This is 
because when non-mineral industries are rendered uncompetitive by the Dutch disease, 
the lobbies that have an interest in the maintenance of the mineral industry as the primary 
industry, since these interest groups benefit from the rents, will argue that they are 
uncompetitive because of unfair competition by foreign manufacturers. Because of this 
reasoning, they will push to protect the domestic, and in some cases infant, industries 
                                                        63 Auty, Richard M. Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis. 
Routledge, New York. 1993. 3-5. 
64 Ibid, 3. 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from foreign competition and this leads to the failed strategy of import substitution 
industrialization.  
 Policies such as import substitution industrialization, or similar ones, create 
restrictions on trade and further lower the non-mining industry’s competitiveness. This 
also lowers the overall productivity of the nation, and leads to a very substantial increase 
in unemployment. This effect is significantly intensified in the case study of Venezuela 
because of the population booms that was experienced after the first oil boom65. The final 
result is a reduction in the income per capita of the country, thus reducing the chances for 
development of the mineral countries66. The effect of the Dutch disease of making the 
non-mining sector of the economy uncompetitive is only aggravated by the protectionist 
policies that usually follow it. These protectionist policies are prominent in the Latin 
American mineral economies since this is an area that has been intellectually flooded by 
ideas that their development possibilities are constrained by their dependence on trade 
with the developed nations. But it is these kinds of protectionist policies that most expert 
economists preach against. It is proposed that a mineral economy’s openness to 
international trade is needed in order to reduce the chances engaging in rentierism and 
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generating the resource curse and the Dutch Disease67. But protectionism is not the only 
effect that is encouraged by the use of oil rents. 
 Oil dependence generates an optimistic bias and leads to a heavy dependence on 
the mineral sector for the governmental revenues. Thus, it tends to lead to the neglect of 
other domestic industries such as agriculture and manufacturing, and this results in two 
socio-economic effects that produce the same thing, unemployment68. The first effect 
produced by the neglect of the agricultural and manufacturing industry is that their 
productivity is dampened, and evidence shows that a reduction in productivity correlates 
with an increase in unemployment69. This occurs because the labor-intensive industry 
such as agriculture and manufacturing are neglected, their productivity is lowered. 
Instead, revenues are generated by a capital-intensive industry such as hydrocarbons, 
which only involve a small percentage of the population70. Therefore, the logical result is 
that the active labor force will be reduced. Besides the effect of increasing the 
unemployment figures, the resource curse will also encourage increasing governmental 
revenues from sources other than mineral rents and the domestic productive sector. This 
means that mineral economies will seek financial loans. 
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 Thus, mineral economies are very likely to borrow from international financial 
institutions and incur large amounts of debt71. The reason why mineral economies make 
the choice of taking external loans is…why not! The extra borrowing of money means a 
marginal increase of governmental revenues and foreign reserves for the development of 
the country. But this is an extra source of revenue that was not produced and was 
generated by an external source to the economy72. The resulting logic is even more rents 
on top of already existing high rents, and if the price boom for the mineral commodity 
continues to increase in the future the debt should be easily financed. Or so policy-
makers thought, and might still think.  
 In reality, the economy is like the law of gravity; anything that goes up must go 
down73. Therefore, the resulting effect is that the government of a mineral economy is 
likely to neglect the multiplier effect that the rents, along with the incurred debts will 
have on the economy, most specifically on a spiraling out-of-control inflation rate74. This 
can be exacerbated if the government decides to print money to finance their huge debts 
after foreign exchange reserves have run out.  
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 Reducing the detrimental effect of hydrocarbon-based development would reduce 
its negative economic effects. Consequently, it would also aid in reducing a socially 
detrimental situation that can lead to effects such as social violence. 
 2) Economic Liberalization 
 The illiberal economic frameworks that are often seen in mineral economies are 
without a doubt unsustainable in the long run. By 1988 the Venezuelan international 
reserves were negative $6.2 billion. This shows that sooner or later corrective measures 
of some kind will have to be undertaken. The Venezuelan case undertook corrective 
measures in 1989 with a structural adjustment deal known as El Paquetazo75. Around this 
time many developing nations also undertook structural adjustment programs that were 
needed mainly due to debt crises. However, when a mineral economy liberalizes, its 
structural adjustment involves a few extra factors to the classical theory. The most 
prominent liberalization policies that are proposed by experts on mineral economies in 
order to prevent the many negative effects created by the deployment of rents, so that 
mineral economies engage in a positive-sum game instead of a negative-sum one, are 
trade openness, economic diversification, macroeconomic stability, a natural revenue 
stabilization fund (NRSF), and transparency and accountability on the part of the 
government76.  
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 As explained earlier, international openness is advocated in order to make the 
non-mining sector competitive and therefore tradable. If the non-mining sector is 
rendered uncompetitive by protectionism and an appreciation of the exchange rate occurs, 
the mining sector will be the only competitive one77. Trade openness will directly help 
the diversification of the economy. This is achieved by making the non-mining sector 
competitive and tradable. It will especially aid in the tradability of those non-mining 
sectors in which the country has a comparative advantage whether regionally or 
globally78. Also, since trade openness may be able to diversify the economy, it will 
increase productivity that will in turn increase employment79. Macroeconomic policies 
geared to the stability of the macro economy are proposed in order to avoid the Dutch 
disease.  
 Sterilizing the rents from the mineral resources that, as previously explained, 
occur when the extra revenue from the mineral exports is saved, thus creating 
macroeconomic stability. This involves capital and trade liberalization along with 
improved fiscal policies such as reducing governmental expenditures, but reducing the  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budget of welfare programs that affect low-income individuals should be avoided. Taxing 
the income of the population to replace mineral rents should be pursued, as it will reduce 
dependence on external sources of income, thus reducing rentierism80. In order to sterilize 
the mineral rents and aid in the macroeconomic stability of the mineral economy a MRSF 
is often advocated in order to prevent the Dutch disease. In such a scheme the revenue in 
excess of formal revenues, or mineral rents, will be placed in a savings fund. This would 
prevent the appreciation of the real exchange rate, the inflation of the economy, and the 
over optimism that leads to incur more debts that create current account deficits which 
cannot be financed81. The policy recommendation of transparency and accountability is 
one that is completely linked to the issue of good institutions in the mineral economies, 
which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 So far the theories that have been examined were the ones dealing with 
Venezuela’s vast oil wealth – the rentier state theory and the resource curse thesis – as 
well as the ones dealing with economic liberalization and reform – the effects of 
structural adjustment. This theoretical framework deals specifically with the nation’s 
economic context within its developmental path, which has been mainly focused on the 
period since the first oil boom in 1971 until the early 1990s. In the fourth chapter the 
theoretical framework, set in this present chapter, will be discussed further and include 
some of the most recent socio-economic events. 
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CHAPTER III: 
THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXTS OF VENEZUELA’S 
DEVELOPMENTAL PATH 
 Besides the detrimental socio-economic effects that the use of hydrocarbon rents 
inflicts on a mineral economy like Venezuela, the negative socio-political effects have 
been just as widespread. The first section will discuss the institutional dynamics where 
the political as well as the economic variables take place as they are important in 
explaining how phenomena develops. The second section will deal with the urbanization 
process. This is a social variable that has had a profound role in generating the nation’s 
political and economic woes. The final section will discuss the theoretical framework 
surrounding the socio-political crisis that has severely affected the recent history of the 
country. 
 1) Institutional Dynamics 
 Arezki and Van der Ploeg (2007) points out, it is unclear whether the resource 
curse causes bad institutions, or whether it just makes already bad institutions worse82. 
But this statement, which carries some validity, assumes that institutions exist. 
Huntington argues that in the third world, which is where most of the mineral economies 
lie, there has been little development of political institutions that are needed for social 
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and economic progress83. In many parts of the developing world, there is an absence of 
political institutions. High political participation without proper institutions generates 
instability and disorder84. These bad or non-existent institutions, which rent-based 
development have generated or have worsened, create governments that are often not 
transparent and unaccountable. The result of these types of governments in the mineral 
economies is that they become highly corrupt, thus the rule of law withers away as the 
graph below shows that the more a country exports its natural resources, and especially 
the more its revenues are dependant on it, the worse the state of the rule of law will be. 
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Graph 1: Correlation Between the Rule of Law and Natural Resource Exports85 
 
Not only does retierism hamper the institutions of mineral economies by creating a 
negative correlation between them and the rule of law but it also has a detrimental effect 
on foreign direct investments. A country with poor or non-existent rule of law has 
reduced judicial security. This discourages investment in the mineral economy because of 
fears of expropriation or other governmental or social action against investments that will 
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not be able resolved through the domestic courts86. It would also reduce the state’s ability 
to provide effective security against social violence. Therefore the creation of institutions, 
or the strengthening of them in a mineral economy, is extremely important in order to 
acquire transparency and accountability.  
Poor institutions, or non-existent institutions in mineral economies can hinder the 
effects of any of the above mentioned policy recommendations. The NRSFs effectiveness 
will be hindered because the government, due to bad institutions, is not transparent about 
how it uses the fund. Independent institutions are needed in order to hold the executive 
branch accountable for its actions87. Strong institutions are a necessary precondition so 
that the proposed policy solutions can work when implemented in the mineral economies.  
Weinthal and Jones (2006) explain that, “Robust institutions are the product of 
both supply and demand; governments must have an incentive to supply them and 
societal actors must have both the interest and ability to make a credible demand for 
them”88. Because of this, the authors propose that in order to create new well-functioning 
institutions or to strengthen current ones, private ownership of domestic enterprises will 
generate the legitimate demands that are needed for the government to supply good 
institutions89. Most enterprises and especially those involved in the mineral industries are 
state-owned in mineral economies. If they are privatized, along with non-mining  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87 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enterprises, they will less likely to be corrupt since they are concerned with profitability. 
This is unlike government owned enterprises that have no incentive to show good 
performance, and does not create an incentive for efficiency, transparency and 
accountability90. Governments in mineral economies generate revenue from the mineral 
rents instead of from the citizens’ income taxes. Because of this, the people are not able 
to legitimately and effectively demand that their government produce good institutions91. 
But the authors qualify the statement by acknowledging that the process of creating or 
strengthening institutions is one that is time demanding92. But not all experts share the 
often-hailed policy recommendation of privatization as a means to generate transparency 
and efficiency.  
Joseph E, Stiglitz (2007) argues that when privatization is engaged without the 
existence of strong institutions, it cannot be effective in its goal of achieving transparency 
and efficiency. In fact, privatization in the absence of existing well-established 
institutions can result in a even larger failure than their often-criticized public 
counterparts93. Stiglitz puts forward the example of Russia, where the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) argued for rapid privatization in order to reduce the advent of 
corruption. But the result was not one that can be used, as an example of success, but of  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failure since the amount of corruption and inefficiency, especially in the oil companies, 
was rampant94. Stiglitz’ skepticism seems to have merit in the case of Venezuela. In the 
Venezuelan case, the structural adjustment that occurred in 1989 reduced state capacities, 
and the private sector was unable to revitalize itself alone and take over former public 
enterprises95. Therefore, the mismatch between demand for employment and supply of 
employment persisted after liberalization. This means that rapid liberalization, and 
especially privatization, alone can hardly be recommended as a policy solution for 
mineral economies.  
The example of Norway is able to disprove the inability of public enterprises from 
working transparently and efficiently96. Stiglitz (2007) argues that before privatization 
can be engaged, which is not undesirable, a well developed legal framework, tax system, 
and corporate governance structure must be in place along with financial institutions that 
can provide funding to worthy investment projects after their assessment – instead of the 
indiscriminate use of mineral rents97. Stiglitz also shows another interesting example, 
Malaysia, where the oil industry developed a reasonably high degree of both transparency 
and efficiency by the mutual development between both public and private enterprises. 
This public-private partnership allowed for the, “Transfer of technology, skills, and 
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understanding of organizational structures to enable the creation of an honest and 
efficient public sector extractive industry”98. Thus, strong institutions generate an 
atmosphere where privatization can positively and substantially aid in development, not 
the other way around. The building of these institutions generally comes from a popularly 
dreaded source, taxes. 
Terry Lynn Karl (2007) states that in order to avoid rent-seeking behavior a 
“fiscal social contract” is required by all actors, domestic and international, that not only 
includes the government and enterprises but the society of the mineral economy99. 
Following British philosopher Edmund Burke’s maxim, “The revenue of the state is the 
state,” Karl explains that European states developed amid constant border wars and 
conflicts that forced them to maintain large standing armies100. In order to achieve this 
European states had to develop systems of popular taxation – income, sales, import and 
other taxes of the like. The result of the need to tax their citizens is that European states 
developed a strong state-society linkage where organizational structures – institutions – 
were demanded so that a state-society consensus on the expenditure of the people’s taxes 
could be reached101. Direct and progressive taxation of the people also provided these 
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developed polities with a tool of wealth distribution to achieve general social welfare102. 
But oil-rich states did not develop a state-society linkage due to the fact that the 
government’s revenue did not originate from the people. Fair and efficient redistribution 
of wealth and strengthening of the rule of law as well as institutions were absent in 
mineral economies because they lacked the “stateness” that was developed in Europe and 
in other successful emerging economies, such as the Asian Tigers103. Karl cites the 
example of Norway that possessed a diversified tax-base and strong legal and political 
institutions. With the advent of large oil revenues, Norway did not lower its taxes104. 
Thus the revenue of the state did not change, which impeded the change of the state itself.  
Economic liberalization and reform can be seen as a necessary step for a mineral 
economy, because as the Venezuelan case shows, the economic framework based on 
hydrocarbon rents is unsustainable. This generates a detrimental socio-economic situation 
in the country as the appearance of high inflation and high unemployment can 
demonstrate. But the analysis of the surge in social violence cannot be limited to purely 
economic factors. 
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2) Urbanization 
Even though it is important to analyze how the economic framework of the 
country and its evolution and effects on society and violence, other variables must be 
given attention. One of these variables is the process of urbanization. The process of 
urbanization in Venezuela, and in the Latin American region, has been characterized by 
two events. The first one was the rural-urban exodus that occurred with very accelerated 
force throughout the 20th century but with even more force in the second half of the 
century. This was a rather unorganized and poorly planned process that left well over 70 
per cent of the Latin American population living in urban environments105. The second 
characteristic is the population boom that took place also in the second half of the 20th 
century106. These two forces shaped an urbanization process that created more than just 
poverty and misery. 
When looking at a city such as the Venezuelan capital of Caracas, the effects of 
the urbanization process can be easily appreciated. The same is true of other Latin 
American and developing countries. In Caracas the popularly termed, el cinturon del 
hambre (the belt of hunger) exhibits a great number of shantytowns around the hills that 
surround the valley in which Caracas lies. Some analysts claim that it is the poverty in 
this environment of misery that causes the rise of social violence. But analysts such as 
Briceño-Leon (1999) argue that there is too much emphasis on poverty and misery as a  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trigger for violence that other important factors are often overlooked. He argues that there 
is a breakdown of the expectations that were promised by the ever-modernizing urban life 
to second and third generation urban migrants107. Because the new and young generations 
of urban migrants do not see their expectations of modern urban life realized because of 
the precarious, unorganized, and poorly serviced urban environment that their families 
came to, they felt excluded. Exclusion has an effect on the personality of individuals. In 
the case of the young second or third generation urban migrants whose environment in 
unable to provide them with a formal job or activity as a legitimate and traditional form 
of achieving a high societal status, they are highly inclined to achieve a high societal 
status and respect through illegal and often violent activities108. Furthermore, the 
precarious conditions that these new generations of urban migrants find themselves in has 
allowed the erosion of social institutions that maintained the orderly working of society 
back when they lived in the rural areas. The family, the school, and religion lost their 
influence as mechanisms for social control109. Thus, illegal and violent activities were 
able to emerge and increase since the urbanization process has eroded the societal 
institutions and were unable to check them.  
                                                        107 Briceño-Leon, Roberto. “Violencia y Desesperanza: La Otra Crisis Social de America Latina 
(Violence and Hopelessness: The Other Social Crisis of Latin America).” Nueva Sociedad. 1999. 
P. 124. 108 Zubillaga, Veronica. “Los Varones y Sus Clamores: Los Sentidos de la Demanda de Respeto 
y las Lógica de la Violencia Entre Jovenes de Vida Vieolenta en Barrios de Caracas (Men and 
their Clamors: The Reasons Dehind the Demand for respect and the Logic of Violence Between 
Young Men and Violent Life in the Slums of Caracas).” Espacio Abierto Cuaderno Venezolano 
de Sociologia. Vol 16 No 3. July-September. 2007. P. 584-585. 
 109 Briceño-Leon. “Violencia y Desesperanza.” 1999. P. 125. 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The legacy of the urbanization process in Venezuela has been one of poverty and 
failed institutions of social control. This has contributed to an environment where 
violence is permitted and even encouraged since illegal activities fill the void left by the 
inability of traditional institutions from working in the precarious environments created 
by rapid and unorganized rural –urban exodus. In the Venezuelan case, this situation also 
played an important role in the politics of the nation at the end of the 20th century. It has 
been a process that even further escalated the levels of social violence. 
3) The Socio-Political Crisis 
 As explained before, the nation of Venezuela can be confidently classified as a 
rentier state. Yet its modern history shows that even as a textbook example of a rentier 
state it has several features that contradict the rentier state theory. This is because 
rentierism did not stabilize the country’s political regime110. As mentioned, the 
democratic pact making system that existed from 1958 ended with its collapse in 1994 
when a candidate was elected without any support from the two dominant parties. The 
collapse of the pact-making system was a result of this system’s inability to efficiently 
address Venezuela’s woes. This is because policy-makers under the pact-making system 
sought the stability and continuance of the political system. Therefore, they attempted to 
solve the nation’s woes through poorly organized appeasement instead of contestation 
                                                        110 Mähler, Annegret. “Oil In Venezuela: Triggering Violence or Ensuring Stability? A Context-
sensitive Analysis of Ambivalent Impact of Resource Abundance.” German Institute of Global 
and Area Studies (GIGA). Working Papers no 112. October. 2009. P. 7. 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and open debates111. But because the political system of pact-making collapsed, the result 
was an institutional void that was waiting to be filled. 
 After the Venezuelan political pact making system collapsed in 1994 and left a 
more impoverished country with a high concentration of the poor in the urban areas, the 
nation’s development allowed for the rise of a new political system based on a discourse 
that must be labeled anti-politics. This is because it directly challenged the policies and 
frameworks of the previous political system. In December of 1998, a new administration 
was elected whose campaign and public management style was based on a personalistic 
and populist approach that appealed to the impoverished masses by using an anti-politics 
rhetoric. Political economist Jonathan DiJohn (2005b) explains that “Populism [and 
personalism], understood in political terms as the de-institutionalization of political 
authority, emphasizes the relatively insignificant role intermediary institutions like 
political parties, labor unions, the legislature, and so on, play in legitimating public 
authority and in executing public policies”112. This dynamic was experienced in 
Venezuela by the administration that took office in 1999. DiJohn goes on to explain that 
this type populist, personalistic, and hyper-presidentialist that severely weakened the role, 
importance and effectiveness of the judicial and legislative powers has not been a new 
occurrence either in Venezuela or in the Latin American region. He argues that what has 
made “Chavismo” different than in other cases is its way of counteracting the global neo-
                                                        111 Naim, Moises and Ramon Piñango. El Caso Venezuela: Una Ilusión de Armonia (The Case of 
Venezuela: An Illusion of Harmony). Ediciones IESA. 2nd Edition. Caracas. 1985. P. 554-555. 112 DiJohn, Jonathan. “The Political Economy of Anti-Politics and Social Polarization in 
Venezuela 1998-2004.” Crisis States Research Center. Working Paper no. 76. December. 2005. 
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liberal economic regime that, as the Venezuelan government argues, is at fault for the 
country’s economic, social, and political woes113. But even though this is an analysis that 
has provided this Venezuelan administration with international attention and sympathy by 
different groups and nations, it is a simplistic analysis that ignores the full socio-
economic dynamics of the country. 
 The simplistic argument that Venezuela is an example of the backlash of neo-liberal 
policies and globalization that has generated the precarious socio-economic condition that 
has yielded, amongst other things, high levels of social violence does not take into 
account the full experience and factors affecting the country. The internationally 
recognized Venezuelan analyst Moises Naim explains that, “Contrary to the conventional 
wisdom, Venezuela’s problem is not too much globalization but too little. Its current 
economic woes and social deterioration are the consequence not of market reforms but of 
the failure to reform its economy”114. This is because the country had a long history of 
illiberal economic frameworks and that just because a structural adjustment program was 
implemented it cannot be concluded that it was designed and executed correctly or that it 
was unnecessary. There are other factors that have to be examined in conjunction so that 
a better explanation of the country’s ills can be forged. 
 Four socio-economic factors have been prevalent in the modern history of 
Venezuela that are often overlooked and even less often are they analyzed in conjunction                                                         113 DiJohn, Jonathan. “The Political Economy of Anti-Politics and Social Polarization in 
Venezuela 1998-2004.” Crisis States Research Center. Working Paper no. 76. December. 2005. 
P.  4‐5. 114 Naim, Moises. “The Real Story Behind Venezuela’s Woes.” Journal of Democracy. Vol 12 
No 2. April. 2001. P. 17. 
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with one another. The first one is the process of urbanization that brought to the urban 
migrants and its subsequent generations the expectations of an ever-improving quality of 
life through the process of modernization. This process was rapid and unplanned as 
governmental intervention in the provision of public services to many urban sectors – the 
impoverished ones115.  
 The second factor has been the high rise of expectations in the Venezuelan 
population by what Naim and Piñango have termed the “demonstration effect.” What this 
term means is that due to very high growth rates that the Venezuelan people have 
witnessed over the course of the second half of the 20th century very high growth rates 
that in some instances even constituted world records. This growth allowed for a very fast 
increase in the standards of livings. Therefore some people gained high expectations of 
increasing their standards of living and quality of life. This occurs when people see that 
some of their neighbors were achieving a higher quality of life116. But because of the 
structural poverty that an ill-performed urbanization process created and a stagnant non-
oil economy due to the heavy use of oil rents, some people were unable to achieve, or 
rapidly achieve, high standards of living. Yet the demonstration effect maintained their 
hopes and aspiration.  
 A third factor that allows the first two to interact with the force and speed that they 
did is very particular to the Venezuelan case when only looking at the regional context, 
                                                        115 Briceño-Leon, Roberto. “Violencia y Desesperanza: La Otra Crisis Social de America Latina 
(Violence and Hopelessness: The Other Social Crisis of Latin America).” Nueva Sociedad. 1999. 
P. 128. 
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and it is oil. Moises Naim (2001) elaborates that, “According to a survey conducted in 
August 2000, about 90 percent of Venezuelans believe [that Venezuela is a rich country]. 
In fact, 82 percent think that Venezuela is ‘the richest country in the world.’ This 
assertion is a permanent feature of the national discourse. The specific reference, of 
course, is to the country’s oil wealth and its mineral potential”117. Oil here plays the role 
of intensifier of the whole process. It provided the revenues that allow the economy to 
“jump-start” and generate high growth rates that will lead to accelerated development of 
the urban areas and the creation of the demonstration effect since there are the monetary 
means available to realize it. But it also produced a very important socio-psychological 
effect. This effect is social resentment. It follows logically that if – in the eyes of the 
average Venezuelan, and especially in the eyes of the poor Venezuelan – one lives in the 
richest country in the world, and one sees other people rapidly and substantially 
improving their standards of living, but the individual fails to enjoy the fruits of the 
blessed Venezuelan land, then the individual is being cheated and/or robbed by someone. 
Social resentment did not arise overnight; it grew steadily after the decade of the 1970s. 
But it needed the intervention of another factor for it to truly explode into a serious 
national threat. 
 The fourth socio-economic factor in Venezuela that has to be explained, and that is 
related to the previous three factors, is the one that allowed the effect of social resentment 
to explode to dimensions that would generate a grave national threat and produce the 
country’s number one ill, social violence. The Venezuelan political crisis allowed for the 
                                                        117 Naim, Moises. “The Real Story Behind Venezuela’s Woes.” Journal of Democracy. Vol 12 
No 2. April. 2001. P. 20. 
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rise of a personalistic and populist regime that filled the political void with the politics of 
anti-politics and de-institutionalization putting an end to multi-class politics and 
consensus building. This new political system feeds itself with the needed support by 
politicizing social inequality118. This in turn allows the collective social resentment of the 
masses to be openly expressed and even channeled against the classes that they perceive 
to be at fault for their poverty119. Therefore, this provides an incentive and even a 
legitimizing factor in the minds of the lower classes to engage in social violence to 
retaliate against those that have that have taking their perceived right to the higher 
standard of living that was never given to them by the richest country in the world120.  
 As mentioned in the introduction, the mineral-dependent country of Venezuela 
has shown high amounts of social violence. Most of the literature concerning the mineral 
economies is able to account for the different factors that produce an economically 
detrimental situation. But even though a detrimental socio-economic situation – in other 
words, poverty – can confidently be singled out as a cause for the rise in violence, its role 
is often either exaggerated or placed the sole cause for the rise of violence121. Other 
explanations that have been discussed in this chapter, such as the absence of strong 
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institutions, the urbanization process and the socio-political crisis are very important in 
complementing the explanation surrounding the phenomenon of social violence as this 
phenomenon has a multi-variable cause. The following chapter will provide an in depth 
discussion on the socio-economic and socio-political variables and events that explain the 
rise in social violence since the 1980s in the Venezuelan case. 
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CHAPTER IV: 
CASE STUDY # 1: VENEZUELA 
1) It’s Good to be Rich! The Origins of Oil-based Development 
“Petroleum is the fundamental and basic fact of the Venezuelan 
destiny. It presents today the most serious national problem that the nation 
has known in its history. It is like a Minotaur of ancient myths, in the 
depths of his labyrinth, ravenous and threatening. 
 The vital historical theme for today’s Venezuela can be no other 
than the productive combat with the Minotaur of petroleum. 
Everything else loses significance. Whether the Republic is centrist 
or federalist. Whether voters vote white or any other color. Whether they 
build aqueducts or not…Whether the workers earn five bolívares or fifteen 
bolívares…All issues lack meaning… 
Everything is conditioned, determined, created by petroleum.” 
 Arturo Uslar Pietri, Venezuelan Intellectual122. 
We look more like Saudi Arabia than Brazil. We are Venezuela 
Saudita” (emphasis in original).  
Juan Pablo Perez Alfonso, Founder of OPEC123. 
“Oil…was not black gold; it was the devil’s excrement!” 
Juan Pablo Perez Alfonso, Former Venezuelan Oil Minister124. 
                                                        122 Quoted in Karl, Terry L. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. University of 
California Press. Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1997. P. 73. 123 Quoted in Karl, Terry L. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. University of 
California Press. Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1997. P. 72. 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   In order to explain the complexity of the Venezuelan case, and in particular the 
phenomenon of social violence, the variables that were mentioned in chapters 2 and 3 – 
the nation’s oil wealth, economic liberalization, urbanization and the socio-political 
crisis, will be examined in depth in this chapter. The theoretical framework set out by the 
aforementioned variables will be discussed along with the historical events of 
Venezuela’s developmental history. Therefore, it is important to first examine the 
nation’s historical background. 
 When the first oil boom occurred in 1973, North American scholars saw the case 
of the Venezuelan mineral economy as “exceptional” because unlike its OPEC 
counterparts, which consisted of illiberal Middle Eastern autocracies, Venezuela enjoyed 
a somewhat established history of democratic rule with a multi-party system that tended 
to have centrist policies125. The optimism enjoyed by foreign intellectuals was very much 
shared inside the country. “God is Venezuelan!” was a popular feeling that was truly 
believed by the Venezuelan people and its policy makers as the massive oil windfalls 
went into the country as if they had fallen from the heavens. During the one-year period 
after the start of the oil boom the Ministry of Finance found itself with an extra $10 
billion, and for a nation that at the time had a population of 12 million people, this was an 
increase of almost $1000 extra per capita. With this new found wealth the presidential 
elections that were scheduled for the same year when the oil boom took place was easily                                                         124  Quoted in Naim, Moises. “The Devil’s Excrement: Can Oil-Rich Countries Avoid the 
Resource Curse?” Foreign Policy. September/October. 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/08/17/the_devil_s_excrement (Accessed on 
September 19, 2009). 2009. 
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Karl, Terry L. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. University of California 
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won by the candidate of the white party, Acción Democrática (Democratic Action), who 
ran a campaign that promised to bring development to Venezuela through its new source 
of seemingly never ending revenue.  
 After his inauguration as President of the Venezuelan Republic, Carlos Andres 
Perez implemented his new program termed La Gran Venezuela (The Great Venezuela) 
that was intended to bring self-sustained development to the country and bring it out of 
the depths of the third world. The Venezuelan intellectual, Arturo Uslar Pietri, coined the 
famous phrase, “Seeding Petroleum,” as the opportunity that Venezuela had to transform 
the newfound wealth into productive investment126. President Perez said in a speech in 
Caracas (1979) that, “One day you Americans will be driving cars with bumpers made 
from our bauxite, our aluminum, and our labor. And we will be a developed country like 
you”127. His new plan was greeted with enthusiasm by lawmakers and the people at 
large128. With the new economic power that Venezuela possessed after the oil boom 
nothing seemed impossible in the imagination of this small Latin American nation129.  
 Thirty years later, the rosy picture that was developed form the first oil boom 
ceased to be. Venezuela, by the turn of the 21st century, was not a developed country.                                                         126 Mollejas, Luis Meta. Los Limites de la Revolución: Petróleo y Gobernabilidad (The Limits of 
the Revolution: Petroleum and Governability). School of Social and Economic Sciences. Central 
University of Venezuela Press. Caracas. 2006. P. 7. 127 Quoted in Karl, Terry L. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. University of 
California Press. Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1997. P. 4. 
128 The new plan of Carlos Andres Perez was greeted with such enthusiasm because his party also 
won both chambers of the Venezuelan legislature. 129 Karl, Terry L. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. University of California 
Press. Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1997. P. 71. 
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One of the biggest developments that the nation experienced was not related to positive 
gains in the socio-economic indicators but a record rise in violence that at the time placed 
the nation as the 6th most violent country on the planet130. In 2009, the International Crisis 
Group (ICG) carried out a survey in three major Venezuelan cities, including the capital. 
The ICG found that, “the biggest concern in the country is mounting insecurity in its 
cities and some rural areas. Caracas is the most violent city in Latin America after San 
Salvador (El Salvador), reporting approximately 130 murders per 100,000 inhabitants 
annually, with an estimated total of 13,000 in 2008. “Express kidnappings,” theft and 
armed assault are common, and municipal and state police not only fail to protect 
citizens, but are said to be actively involved in approximately 20 per cent of the 
crimes”131. Therefore, it is important to examine the multi-variable sequence of events to 
explain why a nation that showed large and reasonably realistic amounts of potential for 
positive and meaningful development in the early 1970s went on to greet the new 
millennium with an array of social problems that include, but are not limited to, social 
violence. 
 With the newfound wealth that seemed to be divinely ordained to make 
Venezuela rich and developed, the government embarked on a spending spree of 
ridiculous proportions. The expenditure of the Venezuelan government in the first oil 
boom of 1973 rose by 74.5 per cent! The spending was mainly focused on state projects 
                                                        130 Naim, Moises. “The Real Story Behind Venezuela’s Woes.” Journal of Democracy. Vol 12 
No 2. April. 2001. P. 19. 131 International Crisis Group. “Venezuela: Accelerating the Bolivarian revolution.” Latin 
America Briefing No 22. Bogotá and Brussels. November 5. 2009. P. 6. 
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and import substitution industrialization (ISI)132. Because of the effort to achieve self-
sufficient development through oil-funded ISI programs the government made little effort 
to transfer its savings to the private sector. It created state-owned companies in various 
fields such as electricity, transportation, communications, aluminum, iron ore, and steel, 
which included the ambitious SIDOR Company (Orinoco Steel Company). These ISI 
programs adversely generated inadequate public services that along with high 
unemployment, high inflation, and very anti-egalitarian income distribution created more 
underdevelopment instead of development133.  
The Dutch disease seemed to be taking a strong hold on the country. The ISI 
programs besides generating the negative effects that were stated above rendered non-oil 
industries completely uncompetitive on the international markets134. The autarkic 
measures geared towards import substitution invited the Dutch disease to infest 
Venezuela. Even though investment on non-oil industries grew, they still remained 
internationally uncompetitive. This is due to the autarkic policies of ISI and inefficiency 
on the part of the government that created “a mismatch between investment and potential 
demand”135. After the oil boom of 1973, rentierism and the resource curse took hold of 
Venezuela.  
                                                        132 Karl, Terry L. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. University of California 
Press. Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1997. P. 25. 133 Gelb, Alan and Associates. Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse? Published for the World Bank 
by Oxford University Press. Washington D.C. 1988. P. 291. 134 Ibid, 292. 135 Ibid, 311, 317. 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The Venezuelan government engaged in some effort to sterilize its mineral rents 
by creating the Venezuelan Investment Fund in 1984, which was a Macroeconomic 
Resource Stabilization Fund (MRSF). But with the effects of bonanza there was no 
serious demand for accountability on how the fund was managed, thus corruption 
followed and remained unchecked136. Because oil rents were not effectively sterilized due 
to the unchecked corruption in the MRSF, rent-seeking became part of the framework of 
the Venezuelan state and economy. To make the problem worse the nation went to 
international financial institutions to borrow more money in excess of what the oil-rents 
were providing to the country. Since Venezuela was an oil exporting nation it was seen 
by foreign financial institutions as a very credit worthy borrower thus, its ability to 
borrow money was virtually limitless137. The Venezuelan government borrowed money 
to spend even more than what it was acquiring with the oil rents during the booms, and to 
maintain the high expenditure levels during the oil price bust that occurred after 1979. 
The country’s foreign debts reached $20 billion!138. The Venezuelan government 
neglected the “multiplier-effect” that the extra revenue from the foreign loans had on the 
domestic economy by increasing aggregate demand. The result was very high inflation 
and rising current account deficits139. Economically speaking, Venezuela in the 1970s 
became a case study of how the rentierism and the resource curse unfolds. 
                                                        136 Ibid, 321. 137 Gelb, Alan and Associates. Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse? Published for the World Bank 
by Oxford University Press. Washington D.C. 1988. P. 321. 138 Ibid, 289. 139 Ibid, 321. 
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The founder of OPEC, Diplomat Juan Pablo Perez Alfonso, was a man whose 
wisdom was years ahead of his contemporary countrymen. He became a critic of 
President Perez’ administration from the beginning and remained one even after its end. 
He understood the dynamics of a mineral economy and its risks. On the new plans of 
President Perez for development through oil he affirmed that, “he acted as if we had no 
cages, as if we could shed our poor history, as if we are somehow different from the rest 
of Latin America. Of course we are different. We look more like Saudi Arabia than 
Brazil. We are Venezuela Saudita” (emphasis in original). Deaf ears met Perez Alfonso’s 
warnings that his country was drowning in oil rents140. The bonanza shielded the 
Venezuelan people and their leaders from the dangers of the resource curse. This curse 
destroyed the Venezuelan economy and its hopes for development by destroying any 
ability to produce rational macroeconomic policies.  
To understand the breakdown of rational macroeconomic policymaking in 
Venezuela, it is first necessary to examine the history behind its political system and 
culture. Venezuela briefly took the world spotlight in the early 19th century away from 
Europe, as its revolutionary leader, El Libertador Simon Bolívar, led a liberal 
independence movement based on the ideas of the enlightenment that freed six Latin 
American countries from the rule of the Spanish Empire. That historical event had a 
profound impact on the history of the Latin America, and especially for Venezuela. The 
Venezuelan territories were already sparsely populated at the time of the War of 
Independence and that war reduced the population of the country by almost 40 per cent.                                                         140 Quoted in Karl, Terry L. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. University of 
California Press. Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1997. P. 72. 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This costly war destroyed the traditional elite classes and most of the institutions that the 
Spanish had in place for colonial rule141.  
The Venezuelan experience that greatly differs from that of its northern neighbor, 
the United States, which enjoyed a democratic revolution that maintained the continuance 
of already established British institutions and elites142. Because there were few continuing 
institutions in Venezuela after the War of Independence, disorder followed. In order to 
fill this vacuum of organized authority, Caudillos (strongmen) emerged. Caudillos were 
the norm from the time of independence in Venezuelan until 1958, and for most of Latin 
America until the 1990’s. This led to a long-lasting political culture of personalism and 
“ultra-presidentialism” that is still widely visible and present modern day Latin 
America143. After the dictatorship of General Marcos Perez Jimenez was toppled in 1958, 
there was an attempt to bring Venezuela into the realm of those few countries that have 
experimented with democracy. 
After the end of the Perez Jimenez dictatorship Venezuela created a constitution 
in 1961 based on Pactismo (pact making) that had the goal of allowing a smooth 
transition to democracy by incorporating the different political and economic views 
represented by many different parties into the governmental system144. The delegates of                                                         141 Karl, Terry L. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. University of California 
Press. Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1997. P. 74-75. 142 Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. Yale University Press. New 
Haven. 1968. P. 7. 143 Karl, Terry L. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. University of California 
Press. Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1997. P.  75. 144 Ibid, 93. 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Punto Fijo, which went on to create the Pact of Punto Fijo of 1958 that institutionalized 
the consensus-building system of Pactismo, were the ones who drafted and agreed upon 
the new democratic system for the country. This new idea accomplished the goal of 
creating a stable democracy and policymaking apparatus. But a decade of stable 
democracy in Venezuela does not mean that it had accomplished the important task of 
creating effective and independent institutions that could sustain the new democratic 
system.  
The new democratic order enshrined in the Pact of Punto Fijo dealt not only with 
the political issues of governability but also with economic issues. The delegates of Punto 
Fijo came predominantly from left-leaning parties. Therefore the economic structure that 
they set out to develop, “Included the strengthening of the protectionist policy, and the 
harmonization of unions, which were fed by governmental subsidies”145. It is important to 
note the pre-boom economic policymaking as it will aid in explaining the post-boom 
economic rational and the ease with which the Dutch Disease, as well as the rent-seeking 
that took hold of the country and the socio-economic effects that it would produce.  
One of the most decisive moments in the History of Venezuela arrived in 1973. 
The first oil boom that took place in 1973 saw the price per barrel rise by 419 per cent. In 
1976, the GDP per capita of Venezuela equaled than that of West Germany and was 
double that that of Italy. Rentierism was poised to infect the policymaking apparatus of 
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the under-institutionalized state146. Discussions started on the way that the nation should 
move forward. The wise words of advice and criticism of Uslar Pietri and of Perez 
Alfonso were always present, but often ignored. This was the first major stress test of the 
Pact of Punto Fijo. Unfortunately, in hindsight we can see that the political system failed 
the test as the ensuing effects of the resource curse brought back the “ultra-
presidentialist” system that haunted Venezuelan politics since independence. 
The incredibly high oil windfalls that were generated in the first oil boom made 
government officials question the role of a democratic system. A congressional debate 
began on the “Special Powers Act” that would give President Perez the power to rule by 
decree. One minister of Perez’ cabinet commented by saying that, “frankly I don’t 
believe that the democratic system is the only way – or even the best way – out of 
underdevelopment. In fact, I would say that we may do better with another type of 
system. But my interpretation of the Special Powers Act is that it allowed us to get 
around the slowness and the restrictions. Congress is just a restriction here. The president 
needed decree power…so that he could preserve democracy in the end”147. With the 
president’s party controlling congress the voice of opposition by other parties was struck 
down. In 1974 the Venezuelan Congress passed the Special Powers Act. This action gave 
the president extremely high amounts of power. It gave him the power of congress itself; 
                                                        146 Karl, Terry L. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. University of California 
Press. Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1997. P. 119-120. 147 Quoted in Karl, Terry L. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. University of 
California Press. Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1997. P. 128. 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he became now the law maker and the one who executes those laws, all in the name of 
overriding the slow process of democracy148.  
The centralization of power in the national executive rendered the Venezuelan 
Congress virtually useless. On average the Venezuelan Congress produced 28 laws per 
year during the time when the Special Powers Act was in force. The Venezuelan congress 
may be compared with other Latin American legislatures such as the Brazilian Federal 
Senate that produced 827 laws per year during the same timeframe of the Perez 
administration, the Argentinean Chamber of Deputies produced 300 laws during the same 
time period. The Venezuelan legislature is only comparable to the Cuban People’s 
Assembly, a body that produced on average 27 laws per year149. During the years of the 
Special Powers Act, President Perez made many political appointments, state expenditure 
and tripled passed the law against unfair dismissals that tightened the labor market. These 
actions were targeted without much strategic planning in order to appease the immediate 
demands of the population instead of seeking tougher but sustainable solutions. This 
example gives weight to Okruhlik’s (1999) argument that the inequitable use of oil 
windfalls arises because of political reasons, not because of the rentier framework150. The 
use of arbitrary power on political and economic matters worsened the state of the 
economy, made the country unattractive for investment and caused capital flight. These 
actions created an increase in consumption based on the ill-advised thinking that the                                                         148 Karl, Terry L. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. University of California 
Press. Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1997. P. 129. 149 Ibid, 106. 150 Okruhlik, Gwenn. “Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise of Opposition: The Political 
Economy of Oil States.” Comparative Politics. Vol. 31 No. 3. April. 1999. P. 308. 
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boom in oil windfalls was virtually indefinite. This accustomed many Venezuelans to 
“[higher] standards of living that could not be sustained”151. The snowball effect that oil 
rents had created was getting bigger and with the exception of Perez Alfonso, nobody 
seemed to have seen it coming. The impending snowball of the resource curse was going 
to hit Venezuela after the collapse of oil-prices in the mid 1980s. 
2) Inflated Economy, Deflated Productivity and Chaotic Urbanization 
Venezuelan policymakers thought that they would be able to “seed the petroleum” 
by simple heavy investment. No policies were implemented or envisioned for the 
prevention of the negative effects of the resource curse such as the Dutch Disease. 
According to the theory behind the Dutch Disease, the productivity of the manufacturing 
sector is neglected and begins to decline due to rentier policies. This occurs as the 
exchange rate becomes appreciated and protectionist measures render the domestic 
manufacturing industry internationally uncompetitive. Venezuela is a textbook example 
of this, as it will be explained later.  
In the 1980’s the populist tradition of appeasing the masses through subsidies and 
corruption was still the norm in the resource curse infested state of Venezuela even after 
Perez left office. Subsequent Presidents such as Herrera Campíns and Jaime Lusinchi did 
not help the country to recover from rentierism and the resource curse that began after the 
oil booms of the 1970’s. Venezuela, during the period 1980-1988, experienced the severe 
effects of the resource curse during the price bust, when its oil exports fell 51.8 per cent 
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in real terms. But rent-seeking behavior did not recede with the price bust because this 
behavior had become the framework of the decision-making apparatus152. The effects of 
the bust were becoming painfully real for the Venezuelan people as Venezuela’s negative 
balance of payments kept on rising.  
In 1983, Venezuela suffered its first major oil bust. This economic shock 
triggered a series of economic policies that worsened the nations’ socio-economic 
situation. The government decided to heavily devaluate the Venezuela currency, the 
bolivar (Bs.) that had been maintained on a fixed exchange rate of 4.3 Bs. to one U.S. 
dollar. This fixed exchange rate had the advantage that it kept inflation relatively stable. 
The move was inspired by the desire to reduce the country’s imports as they had become 
cheaper than domestic products153. This was done in the context of a restrictive trade 
atmosphere. Venezuela had some of the highest import tariffs in all of Latin America. At 
one point the maximum tariff reached 135 per cent154. These events have to be seen in 
light of the type of productive investment that marked the country. Productive investment 
had focused on the oil industry while the manufacturing sector had been left unproductive 
(see table 2). This caused two interrelated effects. The first was on increased 
unemployment because the labor-intensive manufacturing sector was declining while the 
capital-intensive oil sector was expanding. The oil industry historically accounted for one 
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Karl, Terry L. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. University of California 
Press. Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1997. P. 162. 153 Briceño-Leon, Roberto. “Violence in Venezuela: Oil Rent and Political Crisis.” Ciência & 
Saude Colectiva. Vol. 11 No. 2. April/June. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 2006. P. 318. 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third of GDP, but it employed less than 2 per cent of the population155. The second 
negative effect was increased inflation. This occurred because the amount of currency 
dramatically increased – due to devaluation – compared to the amounts of goods in the 
country – because manufacturing capacity is decreased – and currency found it difficult 
to escape to the international market in exchange for goods because of high import tariffs. 
Furthermore, the worsening macroeconomic balance of payments deficit further 
undermined the socio-economic situation. Graph 2 will show the evolution of 
Venezuela’s inflation and unemployment rates as indicators of the state of the socio-
economic situation. But there are other factors besides the negative effects of using 
hydrocarbons as the fuel for development. 
Table 2: Growth Trends in the Venezuelan Economy 1920-2002156 
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Graph 2: Annual Inflation and Unemployment Averages in Venezuela157 
 
Venezuela’s economic history is dominated by the dynamics inflicted on it by oil 
rents. But there other factors have to be taken into consideration so that the deterioration 
of the socio-economic situation can be accurately explained. These factors are the 
nation’s population and urbanization. Venezuela saw its population more than doubled in 
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a period of about three decades from the time of the first oil boom158. This population 
pressure meant that there were a rising number of new entrants into the economy that 
would demand employment. To this factor has to be added the often-overlooked 
urbanization process. The rural-urban exodus had left all Latin American nations – since 
the urbanization process was common to the entire region – with over 70 per cent of their 
populations living in urban settings and leaving the rural semi-feudal production systems 
to a relative minority159. Urbanization had been seen as a synonym of modernization and 
an ever-rising quality of life. But the new generations of the rural migrants that were born 
and grew up in the urban settings did not find this to be accurate. 
Urbanization brought high expectations to the rural migrants and even more to the 
new generations that were born in the urban settings. Many of these rural migrants, and 
their offspring consisted of relative low-income households. The move to the urban 
sphere, and being raised in it, signified an improvement of their educational and work 
opportunities. These expectations were enhanced by the fact that they saw some of their 
urban neighbors continually improving their quality of life and standards of living. In a 
nation such as Venezuela the process of increasing once standards of living was quite 
fast, which increased the expectations of the, mainly low-income, rural migrants. But 
many of these migrants did not see their expectations realized. They were part of an 
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urbanization process that was highly unorganized and rather chaotic. The result was a 
condition that was not conducive to ever-rising standards of living.  
The precarious conditions in the impoverished urban sectors were greatly affected 
by a large reduction of governmental interventions in these low-income sectors that their 
unorganized development did not allow for well functioning public services – such as 
water and electricity – to be included. This also led to a reduction in the presence of 
schools, hospitals, and police160. This acts seriously undermined the expectations that the 
rural migrants possessed – especially amongst young people – because the promise of 
upward social mobility was unfulfilled161. Thus, the nation’s urbanization process had a 
direct effect in increasing the brutally high impoverishment of Venezuela’s population 
after the 1980s162. Because of this economic constraint, people, especially the young, do 
not have an opportunity through formal channels to achieve traditional social 
improvement that would provide them with a respectable position vis-à-vis their family 
and community. The result is often that they will seek this social improvement through 
non-formal, meaning illegal, means that most often leads to violence163. Keeping these 
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socio-economic factors in mind, the evolution of other factors in Venezuela’s 
developmental history will be looked at the following section to further explain the causal 
web of variables that aid in explaining the country’s gradual rise of social violence. 
3) Economic Reform and Political Revolution 
The Venezuelan government of Carlos Andres Perez began to run out of hard 
currency, US dollars in the Venezuelan case, which was needed to maintain the policy of 
popular appeasement through heavy subsidies. By 1988, International reserves were 
negative US$ 6.2 billion and the budget deficit reached 9.9 per cent of GDP164. Because 
of this, Carlos Andres Perez was elected in 1988 for a second term. Even though he was 
still unpopular, the other prospective candidates were even more unpopular, and the 
people remembered the “good times” of his first term in the 1970s when the first oil 
boom took place. This was an attempt by the Venezuelan people to relive the good years 
of the first oil boom when everything seemed to be in the best possible condition165. With 
his re-election and the new mandate to take Venezuela out of the hole that he helped put 
it in, Perez engaged in negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
other international financial institutions in order to receive loans to service the high 
amounts of debts that had accumulated and to finance the balance of payments in 
exchange for structural adjustment. The end result of these negotiations was termed as El 
Paquetazo (literally means being hit by a packet) that contained elements of structural 
adjustment involving the dismantling of awkward policies in three areas of the economy,                                                         164 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Venezuela.” International Political Science Review. Vol. 26 No. 1. 2005. P. 110. 165 Briceño-Leon, Roberto. “Violence in Venezuela: Oil Rent and Political Crisis.” Ciência & 
Saude Colectiva. Vol. 11 No. 2. April/June. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 2006. P. 322. 
  65 
“state intervention, subsidization of organized private interests, and sustained increases in 
social spending”166. This was the typical structural adjustment formula that was based on 
a “Big Bang” approach: an approach that restructures the economy all at once167. But this 
package of reform was a complete and utter surprise to the people of Venezuela, a 
surprise that became very costly. 
By the end of the 1980s, Venezuela began to experience a serious decrease in 
basic products. These shortages in basic goods were due to the decline in foreign reserves 
that caused a decrease in imports, as well as to the inability of the Dutch-diseased 
manufacturing sector to fill the demand gap. This is one of the main reasons that Carlos 
Andres Perez was reelected in 1988. The Venezuelan people hoped that the basic goods 
shortages would be overcome with the populist and redistributive policies that Perez 
implemented in the 1970s168. Although Perez’ campaign was focused on the very same 
populist rhetoric that he delivered in the 1970s, once in office his actions were contrary to 
his campaign promises. The term of El Paquetazo comes from the fact that the reform 
packages hit the people by surprise. The policy intentions of the Perez administration 
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were hidden from the public until they were administered. The result is that the economic 
shock that the policies intended to cause also generated a negative social shock169.  
In 1989, popular appeasement abruptly ended with a reduction of public services. 
As a result of El Paquetazo’s structural adjustment policies, the public became enraged. 
This particularly affected people of low-income because they depended on subsidized 
transportation and food. Although there were several sectors where reductions in public 
subsidies generated discontent, in Venezuela there is no price increase that can generate 
as high a level of unrest as an increase in gasoline prices. With one of the historically 
lowest, if not the lowest, gasoline prices in the world, the doubling of gasoline prices in 
early 1989 was the last drop of water that an enraged public needed to explode170. The 
result was El Caracazo of 1989 where violent protests left an official death toll of 350 
people (around 1000 people dead according to unofficial sources). President Perez 
declared a state of emergency. Inflation hit a record high of 98.3%. He refused 
emergency loans that were offered by the United States, and the IMF pushed for even 
more structural adjustment that Perez subsequently implemented, as he saw no other 
viable option171. Even though the move was extremely unpopular, as clearly 
demonstrated by the social unrest, his policies showed evidence of having short-term 
positive effects on Venezuela.  
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After structural adjustment was implemented in Venezuela under the 
recommendation of the IMF, capital flight stopped, the private sector was briefly 
revitalized, foreign investment returned to Venezuela, and the country’s foreign reserves 
almost doubled. But the effects of the rentierist policies were too deep. Conflicts could no 
longer be resolved without “the lubricant of the petro-dollars”172. The Venezuelan 
economy was mortally wounded thanks to the rent-based development strategy. It needed 
something more than just structural adjustment to save it. However, in the case of 
Venezuela, the rentierism argument has its critics. Jonathan DiJohn (2005) explains that 
the economic ills that the country suffered in the 1990s – as can be seen in graph 2 – were 
not only the result of an oil-based development strategy but also of diminished state 
capacity after the neo-liberal structural reforms. The logic behind the World Bank and 
IMF-sponsored structural reform packages is that governments increase their capacity by 
reducing their burdens and competencies to “fundamental” tasks, while leaving 
production and services to the private sector173. But this proved not to be the case since 
liberalization, in Venezuela, failed to revive the private sector to a level that could take 
over public capacities174. Thus, the result was that the state willingly reduced its 
capacities and there was no other entity capable of absorbing them. Venezuelan 
policymakers hoped that they would be able to copy previously successful liberalizations 
that occurred in other countries. 
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The architect of El Paquetazo was the Venezuelan Planning Minister, Miguel 
Rodriguez175. He envisioned the reforms as following the successful Chilean example of 
1982 where economic liberalization and reform placed that country on a path of growth 
that endures to this day176.  
The Chilean experience with economic reform was not recreated in Venezuela 
since the private sector was not revitalized. This was due to three factors that differed 
from other successful experiences with liberalization, which includes – but it is not 
limited to – Chile. First, low state capacity failed to create a safe environment for 
investment177. Table 3 shows how the already-declining investment rates in Venezuela 
were not stopped by neo-liberal liberalization. Second, the state was not able to prevent 
the massive collapse of the banking system in 1992 that resulted in a gigantic bailout 
equivalent to 18 per cent of the GDP – and corrupt bankers, due to poor regulation 
resulting from decreased state capacity, stole some US$ 7 billion178. Claessens and 
Leeven (2003) show that the development and strength of the financial system was 
directly related to the strength of the institutional framework179. But with a reduced state                                                         175 It is important to note here that although international organizations supported the structural 
adjustment packages in Venezuela, there is no evidence of them putting any kind of pressure on 
the Venezuelan government. Therefore, foreign interests or influence did not drive the reforms 
but domestic policymaking DiJohn, Jonathan. “Economic Liberalization, Political Instability, and 
State Capacity in Venezuela.” International Political Science Review. Vol. 26 No. 1. 2005. P. 
110. 176 DiJohn, Jonathan. “Economic Liberalization, Political Instability, and State Capacity in 
Venezuela.” International Political Science Review. Vol. 26 No. 1. 2005. P. 109. 177 Ibid, 112. 178 Ibid, 113. 179 Claessens, Stijn and Luc Leeven. “Financial Development, Property Rights, and Growth.” 
The Journal of Finance. Vol. 58 No. 6. December. 2003. P. 2401. 
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capacity from rapid liberalization, the institutional framework was weakened. Third, 
Venezuelan policymakers did not take into account the governmental preconditions in 
other successful, or more successful, reforming states. In both Chile and Mexico reforms 
were carried out, “In the context of non-democratic continuity.” In other words, in 
authoritarian states, public capacities were not going to be risked since their ability to 
remain in power depends on it. In Peru, President Alberto Fujimori reached a consensus 
with the military, his political party and other political agents before implementing 
liberalizing reforms. Unlike these examples, Venezuela was a democratic state subject to 
social pressures that Chile and Mexico were not, and President Perez did not seek any 
kind of consensus – even within his own political party – and executed reforms as a 
secret bombshell180. With a severely hampered state capacity that could not prevent a 
banking crisis or the eventual worsening of socio-economic indicators from spiraling out 
of control during the 1990s, the outcome was an ever-worsening social situation and 
political unrest.  
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DiJohn, Jonathan. “Economic Liberalization, Political Instability, and State Capacity in 
Venezuela.” International Political Science Review. Vol. 26 No. 1. 2005. P.  118. 
  70 
Table 3: Gross Fixed Investment Rates, Venezuela, 1950 to 1998181 
 
In 1992, after two deadly, but unsuccessful, coup attempts to unseat Perez, the 
democratic pact – the Pact of Punto Fijo – which had prevailed in the country since 1958 
and made it seem in the eyes of foreign scholars as an “exceptional case” showed clear 
signs that its foundations were crumbling. This break out of political instability and social 
discontent and unrest against the socio-economic ills that worsened with the banking 
crisis. With no petro-dollars to appease the masses, within the next two years the murder 
rate almost doubled in absolute numbers from 12 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants to 22 
homicides182. Finally in 1993, the Supreme Court successfully impeached President Perez 
for embezzling $17 million in government funds183. The Venezuelan people thought that 
they solved the problem by removing Carlos Andres Perez. In fact the removal of 
President Perez officially ended Pactismo, which was internationally hailed for 
maintaining a seemingly stable democracy. This is because in the subsequent presidential                                                         181 DiJohn, Jonathan. “Economic Liberalization, Political Instability, and State Capacity in 
Venezuela.” International Political Science Review. Vol. 26 No. 1. 2005. P. 112. 182 Briceño-Leon, Roberto. “Violence in Venezuela: Oil Rent and Political Crisis.” Ciência & 
Saude Colectiva. Vol. 11 No. 2. April/June. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 2006. P. 321. 183 Karl, Terry L. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. University of California 
Press. Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1997. P. 183‐184. 
  71 
elections of 1994 Rafael Caldera was reelected for a second term without the support of 
any of the traditional parties (Acción Democrática, the Social Democratic party, and 
COPEI, the Christian Democratic party)184. The hope that the nation’s woes would be 
resolved by the removal of the head of state proved to be a fallacy as violence and the 
country’s crisis were not solved and were only in the early stages of their unfolding. 
As the socio-economic situation worsened, criminality and deadly violence grew 
significantly. During the years of 1992 to 1998, the murder rate per 100,000 inhabitants 
remained at an all time high of about 20, this can appreciated in graph 3. This is 
extremely significant in a population that before the decade of the 1990s had not seen 
medium or high degrees of violence185. The number of Violent protests by so-called 
encapuchados (meaning the hooded ones) peaked to an annual average of 100 from 1996 
to 1998186. These encapuchados protested in front of university campuses – the Central 
University of Venezuela in Caracas was a notorious hub for their activities, and they were 
made up of some students and others claiming to be students. They claimed to be 
protesting because of the lack of social services. These shortages came as a result of the 
oil-bust and the inability of the government to subsidize social programs due to low 
international oil prices187. The crisis that the country was undergoing was getting deeper                                                         184 Lopez-Maya, Margarita. “Venezuela 2001-2004: Actores y Estrategias en la Lucha 
Hegemónica (Venezuela 2001-2004: Actors and Strategies in the Hegemonic Struggle).” 
Lateinamerika. Analysen und Berichte. Spanish version. 2004. P. 27-28. 185 Briceño-Leon, Roberto. “Violence in Venezuela: Oil Rent and Political Crisis.” Ciência & 
Saude Colectiva. Vol. 11 No. 2. April/June. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 2006. P. 316. 186 Calzadilla, Fernando. 2002. “Performing the Political: Encapuchados in Venezuela.” TDR, 
The MIT Press. Vol. 46 No. 4. Winter. 2006. P. 105. 
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and deeper without any action taken by the Venezuelan policymakers to try to change the 
nation’s course. The situation was due to take another turn for the worse. 
Graph 3: Homicide Rate per 100,000 inhabitants in Venezuela from 1983 to 
2003188 
 
The presidential elections of December of 1998 saw the predominant Venezuelan 
political parties in the worst of possible situations that they could have encountered. Their 
political slogans no longer resonated with the years of unlimited wealth back when the 
first oil-boom made Venezuelans cheer at the prospect of an ever-abundant future. But 
the Venezuelan people came to realize that God was not Venezuelan. They realized this 
after experiencing rising homicide rates. They realized this when more than 40 per cent 
of people were barely acquiring the most basic living wages in the informal sector189. 
                                                        188 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They realized this after the country suffered Latin America’s largest drop in GDP per 
capita and inequality increase190.  
Because of this situation, in the upcoming presidential elections, the leader of the 
first coup attempt against Carlos Andres Perez, Lt. Col. Hugo Rafael Chavez Frias was 
elected as President of the Republic. He was nominated by a new third party, testament 
that the old two-party political system had collapsed in what Gelb would have described 
as a “crisis of legitimacy” that traditional parties were undergoing since the collapse of 
oil prices of 1986191. Mollejas (2006) is able to further elaborate on the causes and effects 
of this climatic event in Venezuelan history by pointing out that: 
“The inability of the original parties that signed the pact of Punto Fijo to 
appreciate the gravity of the newly instituted changes and the detrimental 
socio-economic consequences of their macroeconomic policy 
(unemployment and sustained inflation, apparently irreversible) along with 
the losing of their legitimacy and governability from a political viewpoint, 
opened the doors in the elections of 1998 so that they could be expelled 
from power by the marginalized people of the Punto Fijo pact: The 
impoverished and underemployed urban population which accepted the 
‘inclusion’ proposal that was offered by the leadership of the extreme-left 
                                                        190 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parties and the militarist elements that were not committed with the 
representative democratic order” (original in Spanish)192. 
In 1999, the new left-wing leader created a new constitution that centralized more power 
in the executive, returning to the old traditions of Caudillismo and ultra-presidentialism 
with radical popular rhetoric that had been absent since the 1940s193. The current 
president has publically noted on numerous occasions that his government is a 
revolutionary government that would completely change the system for the people’s 
welfare, especially by reversing the ill effects that neo-liberal structural adjustment had 
on society. It is important to revisit the failure of the structural adjustment program 
(coined El Paquetazo) as it was not only a central theme in the presidential campaign of 
1998 and an important factor in the Venezuelan political crisis, but was also a factor in 
the rise of violence.  
 Neo-liberal economic reform has been cited as one of the primary, if not the 
primary, source of the nation’s socio-economic woes by both academics and politicians. 
This was especially true in the early years of the Venezuelan administration that took 
office in 1999.  Venezuela, at the turn of the millennium seemed to be a sign that the 
developing world was taking actions, revengeful actions, against the waves of market 
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193 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reforms and globalization that dominated the last decade of the 20th century194. It is 
obvious that economic liberalization failed in the way that it was implemented. The 
liberalization that took place in 1989 did not increase incentives to attract investment and 
generate employment195. In Venezuela, economic reform was implemented in an elitist 
and secretive manner that ran counter to the nation’s democratic principles196. That said, 
there were, although short-lived, positive economic effects from liberalization since 
capital flight briefly stopped, the private sector showed signs of revitalization, and 
foreign reserves almost doubled197. This brings an important point that has to be 
considered when analyzing the effects of economic reforms.  
 The debate surrounding economic reform – in Venezuela and other countries – has 
often centered on the question of whether reform should or should not be undertaken, or 
whether it was good or bad. I believe this is worth noting because in Venezuela the 
reversal of economic reform began not under the Chavez administration but under the 
Caldera administration in 1994 until 1999, which was also elected under an anti-
liberalization slogan198. Analyst Moises Naim (2001) explains that, “Contrary to the 
conventional wisdom, Venezuela’s problem is not too much globalization but too little.                                                         194 Naim, Moises. “The Real Story Behind Venezuela’s Woes.” Journal of Democracy. Vol 12 
No 2. April. 2001. P. 17. 195 DiJohn, Jonathan. “The Political Economy of Anti-Politics and Social Polarization in 
Venezuela 1998-2004.” Crisis States Research Center. Working Paper no. 76. December. 2005. 
P. 8. 
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Its current economic woes and social deterioration are the consequence not of market 
reforms but of the failure to reform its economy”199. Economic liberalization is too often 
used to provide a simplified explanation of events. This is logical considering the 
passionate international debate that surrounds the topic. But unfortunately the effects of 
such simplifications are detrimental as they lead to a significantly inaccurate analysis of 
events. Furthermore, the debate surrounding the issue of economic liberalization, as 
shown by the country’s events, brings to light a structural problem in the political 
economy of Venezuela that has not allowed issues that include, but are not limited to, 
economic liberalization from being implemented efficiently. This issue is, “The 
avoidance of open debates and contestation [that] has been the trademark of the 
democratic governments since 1958 (original in Spanish)”200. As mentioned before, the 
leftist administration in office since 1999 has termed itself as revolutionary. However, the 
politico-economic record, as it will be explained, can demonstrate that a revolution has 
hardly taken place. 
 4) The Worsening of Political and Economic Variables and the Rise of Violence 
With the turn of the millennium, the leftist government introduced the new 
economic plan named, “Socialism of the 21st Century” where import substitution 
industrialization, popular appeasement through subsidization, economic laws contrary to 
the rules of the market, and nationalization of private industries were going to become the 
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norm. But in order to provide an accurate analysis of the leftist administration, the radical 
rhetoric should be placed aside while the policy outcomes are examined.  
The policies that the new Venezuelan leftist regime set in place have not been 
unfamiliar. First of all, it is important to note that all policies were funded and 
conditioned by the oil price-boom of the early 2000s (see graph 4) that allowed for the 
renewal of the oil-based development strategy. In 2003, strict price and monetary controls 
were set, most notably were the foreign exchange controls – the Venezuelan exchange 
rate was fixed to 2150 Bs. (2.15 Bolivares Fuertes, meaning “strong bolivares” after a 
needless currency reconversion that took place in 2008 in order to create an illusion of a 
“strong” currency. Once again the fixed exchange rate was devaluated in January 2010 to 
4.3 Bolivares Fuertes)201. But they have been implemented in the country before. The 
only difference about the execution of these price controls is that they have been much 
more enduring. As of 2010, the foreign exchange control continues, and this why the 
president of Fedecamaras (Federation of Chambers of Commerce), Noel Alvarez (2009), 
has called on the national executive to negotiate a removal of the foreign exchange 
control as it “Is more of an instrument of political control than a mechanism to safeguard 
the economy” (original in Spanish). Alvarez also notes that the inability of enterprises to 
access foreign exchange because of the exchange controls (which has allowed the 
development of a large black market of foreign exchange) and the threats of 
expropriation (a phenomenon that was not seen before in Venezuela) have been 
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disincentives for domestic investment. With a fall in oil-prices in 2008 and further 
economic radicalization, “The productive apparatus [the non-oil economy] has collapsed” 
(original in Spanish)202. But as table 3 shows, investment in Venezuela has been falling 
for over two decades now. This means that there are continuing factors in the economy 
that have hampered productive investment besides the political crisis, economic 
liberalization or reversal of liberalization, and the price volatility that an oil economy 
such as Venezuela would be exposed to.  
Reinier Schliesser (2009), professor of developmental economics from the 
Metropolitan University in Caracas, explains that the ever-important factor of the oil-
busts for the Venezuelan economy does not entirely explain the country’s growth 
slowdown. GDP growth showed signs of decline in the first quarter of 2008 when the 
barrel of oil stood at over US$ 100 and preceding the international financial crisis that 
caused the latest oil-bust. Schliesser provides an explanation for this phenomenon – along 
with price and exchange controls just as Alvarez stated – the ever-increasing levels of 
public spending have crowded out private investment. The professor is not saying that 
private investment is non-existent, as the Venezuelan central Bank places it at 19 per cent 
of GDP. The problem is that private investment is geared towards replacing existing 
equipment and technologies instead of the manufacturing or purchasing of new and 
additional productive plants, resulting in the lack of expansion and growth of the 
productive sector due to governmental disincentives and the crowding out from massive 
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public spending203. However detrimental these policy outcomes to the economy might be, 
they are still not previously unknown in the country.  
In Venezuela, public overspending and the crowding out of the private sector 
have taken place before during previous oil booms. Some experts point out that this 
process began with the massive nationalization process of the oil industry in 1977204. This 
goes to show that the institutionalization of an oil-based development strategy has steered 
policymaking decisions to those that would generate the Dutch Disease with an 
unproductive non-oil economy. However, there is one factor that has negatively affected 
productivity in the oil and public sector, which has not taken place in previous 
administrations. This factor is what Mollejas (2006) terms as the  “lockout” or exclusion 
of political opposition elites after a two-month general strike in 2002 led by the oil 
workers. It was these elite that possessed the “know-how” of the oil industry and other 
public enterprises and after thousands of workers were fired for their political dissidence 
they were replaced by personnel whose only qualification was loyalty to the regime205. 
That note aside, an important socio-economic variable, inflation, has also shown a great 
deal of continuity in the Venezuelan economy. 
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Graph 4: In the Rollercoaster of the Barrel, from 1971 to 2009 (Original in Spanish)206 
 
High inflation has long been part of the Venezuelan economy as graph 2 is able to 
illustrate. Even though there was a substantial dip in the annual average inflation rate at 
the turn of the century, coinciding with the rise of the regime, it has risen again due to the 
oil-boom in the early part of the current decade and the restrictions on capital movement 
as a result of the strict price and exchange controls. This economic indicator, and variable 
of the misery index, has been rising in the last few years. The rise in inflation has to be 
looked at with the decline in productivity, which causes a reduction in purchasing power 
that will directly affect the citizenry. As of 2009, the Venezuelan capital, Caracas, is the 
fourth most expensive city in the world in the prices of foodstuff. Aguzzi (2009) reports 
that the residents of Caracas “Have to spend 604 [US] dollars in order to purchase 39  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[basic] nutritional products. The capital is only overtaken by Tokyo ($710), Zurich 
($658), and Geneva ($633)” (original in Spanish). But the key to analyze this event is 
purchasing power; something that inflation can eat away. In that respect, a study 
performed by the Swiss financial company USB, shows that the top most expensive 
cities, such as Zurich and Geneva, can meet their needs, as they are also the ones with the 
highest amounts of personal income in the world. Whereas the residents of Caracas 
cannot meet their needs since the capital occupies the 53rd place in highest wages. Aguzzi 
also shows that another study finds that in Caracas, the average person must work 126 
minutes in order to buy a Big Mac, 70 minutes for a kilogram of bread, 14 minutes for a 
kilogram of rice, and if they would like the luxury of an Ipod nano of 8 GB they would 
have to work 12 days. In contrast with the Venezuelan capital, in Santiago de Chile – 
where progressive socialism is promoted – its residents only have to work 69 minutes to 
buy a Big Mac, 37 minutes for a kilogram of bread, 36 minutes for the kilogram of rice, 
and 8.6 days for the Ipod207. This goes to show that the realities on the ground may be 
worse than the economic indicators show. I believe that this must be noted since a simple 
observation of the economic indicators may give the wrong impression that the economic 
situation has improved in the post-1999 administration. That said, the social impact of 
economic policies may have worsened but they have followed the same trend for over 
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two decades now. The socio-economic trends cut across political paradigms, just as Uslar 
Pietri said, Venezuela is a country “Conditioned, determined, created by petroleum”208. 
Every Venezuelan administration since the first oil-boom of 1973 has used 
petroleum as the fuel for growth and development. In 1997, renowned political scientist 
and natural resource expert, Terry Lynn Karl, explained that in a mineral economy like 
Venezuela,  
“Regime norms and practices were institutionalized that reinforced 
centralization over decentralization, states over markets, preemption over 
autonomous reaction, restrictiveness over contestation, the purchase of 
elite support over the autonomous organized masses, networks of 
complicity over broadly debated policies, politicization over 
administration, and appeasement over hard choices. These practices would 
define the behavior in the 1973 boom”209.  
This analysis has remained valid well beyond the 1973 oil-boom. There is no difference 
in the framework of the Perez and the Chavez administrations. The reason being that the 
politico-economic framework of Venezuela has maintained it as a mineral economy 
dependant on petroleum revenues. Thus, it has generated a very detrimental socio-
economic setting and its worst outcome yet, high and unacceptable levels of violence.  
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Graph 5: The Misery Index and Violence in Venezuela from 1983 to 2003210 
 
 Graph 5 shows a correspondence between the misery index and violence in 
Venezuela, which may help to illustrate the nexus between a precarious socio-economic 
situation and high amounts of social violence. The Misery Index is a simple equation 
consisting of the sum of the annual inflation rate with the annual unemployment rate. 
Economist Arthur Okun created this equation and it is a simple but highly effective 
indicator of the general socio-economic situation211. As can be appreciated, the                                                         210 Graph created by author with data from International Monetary Fund. “IMF Data Mapper, 
World Economic Outlook April 2009 (Inflation).” 
http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php. (Date accessed August 19, 2009). 2009; 
International Monetary Fund. “IMF Data Mapper, Joint IMF-OECD Statistics 2009 
(Unemployment).” http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php. (Date accessed August 
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Ciência & Saude Colectiva. Vol. 11 No. 2. April/June. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 2006. 
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Venezuelan misery index from the year 1985 to 2003 has exhibited a highly volatile and 
erratic behavior. The negative effects of the rapid liberalization plan implemented under 
El Paquetazo in 1989 shows the first extreme spike in the misery index. This first misery 
index spike receded to much lower – but still considerably high – levels because of the 
positive, but short-termed, macroeconomic stabilization that structural adjustment 
brought212. An important note about the Venezuelan misery index is that its erratic 
behavior is fueled almost exclusively by the inflation rate. The Phillips Curve might 
explain the inverse relationship since unemployment has been kept stable and “relatively” 
low while inflation has been the high and volatile variable213. As explained, the positive 
effects of the reforms were short-lived as they were not able to prevent the subsequent 
banking crisis in 1992, whose effects and second extreme spike in the misery index lasted 
until 1996. This spike was fueled by the massive government-sponsored financial bailout 
equivalent to 18 percent of GDP that attempted to reinsert liquidity in the financial 
market but prompted inflation at the same time214. These two spikes correlated with an 
increase in the annual murder rate per 100,000 inhabitants. But the inconsistency within 
the misery index and between its correspondence with violence has to be accounted for. 
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 In the period of 1998 to 2001 the Venezuelan correspondence does not hold true 
as the misery index is declining while the murder rate is climbing at alarming rates. The 
reason for the decline in misery index after the second spike in 1996 is that there was a 
negative shock to aggregate demand. Between the years 1996-2001 Venezuelan GDP 
decreased on an average of 3.2 per cent, which is a clear indicator that the financial bail 
out was not able to revive the economy and petro-dollars could not be tapped to offset 
demand since they were at an all time low (see Graph 4). The bail-out failed in part 
because the increased liquidity in the banking sector was not transferred as investment in 
the country since a significant portion of it was being taken out of the country as the 
government and the banking sector were not able to generate confidence in Venezuelan 
investors215. After the period of 2001, and ending in 2003, the correspondence not only 
showed itself to be completely direct but both slopes were completely in par with each 
other. As illustrated by this case, when longer time-spans are examined to identify a 
correspondence between a worsening socio-economic situation and a rise in social 
violence was found. But it is also worth noting that statistically; a correspondence cannot 
be established in short time-spans for this specific case. Therefore, it can be preliminarily 
concluded that a worsening socio-economic situation does have a significant effect on 
violence.  
 The Venezuelan murder rate at the turn of the century doubled within three years. 
It became comparable with the Colombian murder rate, which was produced in a country 
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that had been suffering from a four-decade long internal conflict216. The outcome of the 
murder rate is even more dramatic and significant when the total numbers of murders are 
considered: in 1980 the total numbers of murders stood at 1,300, while in 2003 the total 
came to, 13,000. In a twenty-year span, when the population had barely doubled, the 
murder rate multiplies by a factor of ten, which is a 1,000 per cent increase217. When this 
is looked at in combination with a constantly rising misery index, which has for the most 
part remained above 35 per cent ever since 1985 (see Graph 5), the correspondence 
between a poor socio-economic climate and violence over longer periods of time can be 
confidently established. It is also important to note that extremely high misery index 
spikes in the 1990s were not followed by the dramatic rise that Venezuela experienced at 
the turn of the century, which was not accompanied by as high misery index as occurred 
in the 1990s. This important difference may occur because the violent outcomes from the 
misery index are not felt until a significant amount of time after the economic indicators 
show its presence. This means that the misery index may have delayed social 
consequences. But because of the complexity that surrounds the issue of social violence 
and its determinants in the Venezuelan case, along with the limits that statistical research 
imposes on social analysis – that is obvious as difficulties arise when using purely 
quantitative data to explain socio-economic phenomena – is the reason that other 
variables have to be examined. Furthermore, special attention has to be given to variables 
that are not economically deterministic so that a fuller explanation may be provided.  
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 It has already been said by Mollejas (2006) that, “The impoverished and 
underemployed urban population which accepted the ‘inclusion’ proposal that was 
offered by the leadership of the extreme-left parties and the militarist elements that were 
not committed with the representative democratic order” (Original in Spanish) won the 
presidential election in 1999218. The new administration had, from its beginning, 
maintained a popular base by making monetary transfers to the impoverished sectors of 
society219. Since the leftist regime had to maintain its popular base it could not implement 
or enforce policies that would hurt its base and benefit the now vilified “oligarchs” or 
middle and upper classes in Venezuela220. This is why the government took up an 
ambiguous policy towards the issue of crime and security221. Governmental policy in this 
respect has worsened the negative outcomes in the field of violence. 
The ambiguous policy towards security by the socialist regime has gone to the 
point of stating that, “the problem is not that there is insecurity in Venezuela. Rather, this 
improvised [theorizing] of what is happening in Venezuela [argues that the issue] is more 
of a ‘sensation’ of insecurity, created by…the media, who hammers on the subject thus 
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creating this generalized feeling that there is a problem that does not exist”222. Political 
scientist and humorist, Laureano Marquez, wrote a reaction to this specific and somewhat 
recent official statement, which appears below in Appendix A. But the regime’s actions 
go beyond rhetoric to practice as they banned all media outlets from publishing crime and 
murder statistics after 2003. This is the reason that the statistical information’s used ends 
in 2003. This suggests that the murder rate has significantly increased, although most 
figures provided after 2003 may or may not reflect the true reality, as they may have been 
fudged223. Furthermore, it shall be explained that the government’s actions have not only 
involved turning its back on the problem but outright support of violence from the 
regime’s top echelon. 
Venezuelan sociologist, Roberto Briceño-Leon (2006), notes that the president of 
the republic has publically stated that, “ it [is] understandable that people rob when they 
are in need”224. Briceño-Leon also showed that the current head of the Venezuelan 
executive has been running a counter-culture campaign by explaining that, 
“For decades the Venezuelan children were taught, ‘violence is the 
weapon of those, who are wrong.’ The expression has been used for 
preventing young people in the schools from solving their conflicts by 
violence, but also to discourage adults to use violence, mainly during the                                                         222 The Devil’s Excrement. “According to Venezuela’s People’s Ombudsman Soaring Crime is 
Just a Sensation Created by the Media.” July 19th. www.devilsexcrement.com (accessed on 
September 29th, 2009). 2009. 223 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Saude Colectiva. Vol. 11 No. 2. April/June. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 2006. P. 323. 224 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passage of a rural society to urban life. It was surprising to observe how, 
in his speeches of several hours transmitted by all radio and television 
stations, the president several times said that this affirmation ‘is not true,’ 
suggesting that violence can be used and trying to change an idea he knew 
to be deeply rooted in the population”225. 
Such overt public policy can be considered as a factor explaining why the murder rate 
significantly rose from the years 1998-2000 when the socio-economic situation seemed to 
have improved in that period (see graph 5). These precarious political events, which 
occur during the period of an oil boom, seem to follow Friedman’s (2006) “First Law of 
Petropolitics,” which states that “the price of oil and the pace of freedom always move in 
opposite directions,”226. But this counter-culture campaign that has been promoted by the 
head of the Venezuelan executive can also be explained as the product of the nation’s 
developmental history and not only as a political tool to gain the support of popular 
sectors that comprise the majority of society. 
Socio-economic variables, meaning the impoverishment of the population, alone 
may not fully explain the rise in social violence. Other factors, such as the transformation 
of urban centers, are often ignored since they are less visible to the eyes of analysts and 
journalist. This is because of their lack of sensationalism that is provided by other factors 
                                                        225 Briceño-Leon, Roberto. “Violence in Venezuela: Oil Rent and Political Crisis.” Ciência & 
Saude Colectiva. Vol. 11 No. 2. April/June. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 2006. P. 323. 226 Friedman, Thomas L. “The First Law of Petropolitics.” Foreign Policy. May/June. 2006. P. 
31. 
  90 
such as political and economic crises227. In the 1980s the process of the rural-urban 
exodus accelerated and consolidated. The rural migrants were lured to the urban centers 
by the expectations of a better quality of life that would be provided by an ever-
improving household thanks to the modernity of the urban setting228. The urbanization 
process that occurred in Venezuela – and was also common to the Latin American region 
– created two effects that have contributed to the rise in social violence. The first effect of 
urbanization is the breakdown of traditional institutions of social control229. The second 
effect is the breakdown of expectations and the rise of social resentment as the 
“demonstration effect” ceases to be a motivating factor in the pursuit of self and 
communal development230. 
 The Venezuelan population, and the Latin American population as a whole, was 
primarily located in rural environments until the second half of the 20th century. This was 
due to the economic legacy of colonial or semi-colonial productive systems. But due to 
the rural-urban exodus, the Latin American region has now well over 70 per cent of its 
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populations residing in urban environments231. When this exodus occurred, the rural 
migrants brought to the urban setting the traditional social institutions that allowed for the 
peaceful and orderly working of society. Roberto Briceño-Leon (2001) elaborates on the 
evolution of these social institutions. At first they were able to fulfill their role as social 
controllers, but he then explains that, 
“The material situation of their household and of the urban environment 
was of slow but permanent improvement. What happens afterwards is that 
these conditions are altered. This is because the social institutions, in 
particular the family, the school and religion cease to possess the weight 
that they had in regulating daily life. The material situation of the 
households and the environment becomes more complex, thus no 
improvements are observed, but an increase in the number of problems 
due to the rise in density of the poor areas and by the reduction of actions 
[and interventions] by the state”232. 
Since the passage from the rural to the urban environment has diminished or destroyed 
the effectiveness of traditional institutions of social control – and in a environment that 
does not fulfill their expectations of development – the new impoverished households and 
community lose their ability to function in an organized manner.  
 Adding to the previous point is that these communities are not able to substitute 
traditional institutions of social control because the entity that is capable of providing                                                         231 Briceño-Leon, Roberto. “Violencia y Desesperanza: La Otra Crisis Social de America Latina 
(Violence and Hopelessness: The Other Social Crisis of Latin America).” Nueva Sociedad. 1999. 
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them – the government by actions such as with the building of schools, hospitals, 
community centers, and churches – is not present. This is because poor governmental 
planning or restricted governmental capacities and budgets did not allow for the provision 
of public services to the sectors where the rural migrants resettled. Also, many of these 
new urban sectors were comprised of low-income migrants that did not have the means to 
pay for basic services, which restricted their access233. After this is noted, the wisdom in 
the timeless words of Thomas Hobbes (1651) and their relevance to the study of violence 
can be appreciated.   
“Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common 
power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called 
war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man… To this war 
of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can 
be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there 
no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law: where no law, 
no injustice. Force, and fraud, are in war the two cardinal virtues”234.  
Since the transition from rural to urban life made institutions of social control irrelevant 
and government also ceased to assert its influence and control in the new low-income 
urban areas the result was, as elaborated by the classical work of Hobbes, an environment 
highly prone to violence. Furthermore, in addition to the destruction of traditional 
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institutions and lack of governmental intervention by the urbanization process, the effect 
of social resentment also has to be examined. 
 The increased expectations in the population that were created by the urbanization 
process had an important element within them. This element is what Naim and Piñango 
(1985) have termed the “demonstration effect.” They explain that, “This effect consists in 
the augmentation of the aspirations, wishes and ambitions of a person or group as a 
consequence of observing in others living standards, situations or possessions more 
attractive that the one that he, she or them have… Such ‘demonstration effect’ on 
expectations and aspirations operates in all economic brackets of society”235. This effect 
is the element that lies at the heart of the motivation to seek a new life, and continue that 
life, in the urban environment. Moreover, in the Venezuelan case, this effect becomes 
much more relevant than in other Latin American cases because of the nation’s unique 
standing as a petro-state. The progressive improvement of the household’s material 
situation in Venezuela occurred at a very fast pace – especially when compared to its 
regional neighbors236. This is because the country enjoyed a vibrant economy that 
possessed steady and high growth rates, which at times even constituted world records, 
due to the high capital injections that came from the oil rents237. Also, because of the 
nation’s standing as a petro-state, the influence that this factor had on the workings of the 
urbanization process and the “demonstration effect” is more than just economic. It also                                                         235 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has a profound socio-psychological component. 
 Venezuela, a rentier state, has had an urbanization processed heavily influenced by 
a very strong and accelerated “demonstration effect.” Besides the economic workings 
behind this process a severely profound socio-psychological effect emerges because of 
the fact that the people are aware of the nation’s mineral wealth. A public opinion poll 
conducted at the turn of the century showed that 90 per cent of Venezuelans believed that 
their country was a rich one and 82 of the total population not only believe that it is a rich 
country, but that it is “the richest country in the world,” which is, “[a] specific 
reference…to the country’s oil wealth and its mineral potential”238. But even though a 
large proportion of Venezuelans believe that their country is the richest in the world, and 
they see some of their country-mates enjoying continuously rising living standards, a 
great many see that their reality does not match their deeply held beliefs. This is because 
Venezuela, in the past two decades of the 20th century saw a large increase in the poverty 
and inequality levels. Any socio-economic indicator is able to clearly show that poverty 
and inequality has significantly and alarmingly increased since the 1980s239. Therefore, 
there is a mismatch between the expectations that urban life and mineral wealth provide 
and the underdevelopment that has been experienced by the poor sections of the urban 
sphere. This mismatch created a socio-psychological effect that promoted an extremely 
volatile socio-political situation. 
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 The socio-psychological of the mismatch between expectations and reality affecting 
the poor and impoverished urban population of Venezuela led this group of people to 
conclude that their precarious situation in the “world’s richest nation” was due to 
corruption and the theft by politicians and the rich of what was rightfully “theirs”240. The 
result of this thinking was that a collective feeling of social resentment was formed.  
 The Venezuelan political crisis does not seem to have an end in sight. The current 
political elite has not been shy to point the finger at the middle and higher classes for 
being the culprits – as perceived by the impoverished urban classes - of the nation’s woes 
since they have stolen the massive national wealth that belongs to all Venezuelans241. 
This political strategy has been used with great efficacy and success by the post-1999 
leftist administration because it revives the popular expectations that the people once held 
with the urbanization endeavor.  
 The accelerated urbanization process – the rural-urban exodus –that was 
experienced in Venezuela carried with it a Marxist element of communal development. It 
was envisioned that the development and continual improvement of individual 
households was going to be achieved as a collective. As the country developed, 
everybody would also enjoy that development. Sociologist Briceño-Leon (1999) explains 
that, 
“They refer to it in different ways [referring to the expectations raised by 
urbanization], but in the end they all represented the same dream of social                                                         240 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change and a better life. However, amongst the crisis of Marxism and fall 
of the Berlin wall this illusion lost weight as a force for personal 
motivation. What was left was a particular individualism that when it was 
not able to transform itself in acts framed around the new order, it became 
an inducing force for the systematic transgression from the social norms to 
the production of violent men”242. 
This inability to achieve development and social mobility as a collective, and even as 
individuals, affects in particular the young urban poor. The result is that this segment of 
society – as it realized that its expectations are unattainable – replaces its desire for 
development with frustration and hopelessness243. These feelings are easily turned into 
social resentment in a society that perceives itself as rich, and as having a right to that 
wealth. This is a serious inducing factor for violence. 
 The already mentioned politico-economic factors in the Venezuelan case – such as 
a precarious socio-economic situation, a stagnated economy due to its rentierist 
framework, an increasing population, an urbanization process that created structural 
poverty and destroyed traditional institutions of social control, an impoverished 
population that thinks of itself as stripped of the right to tap into the nation’s mineral 
wealth, and finally, a political crisis that has been fed by tapping into the collective social 
resentment of the popular segments of society –  may serve as an explanation of why 
violence has been steadily and alarmingly increasing over the last three decades. This                                                         242 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lengthy concluding statement goes to show the complex web of factors that surround the 
issue of the rise in social violence. No single or specific reason can be given as the 
defining factor to explain it. There are important factors that affect this case, such as oil 
wealth. But to understand the political economy of a particular case all intervening 
factors have to be included and studied, as well as their relation to one another so that a 
satisfactory explanation can be provided. 
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CHAPTER V: 
CONCLUSION 
 Venezuela has seen over the period of 1983 to 2003 a 1000 per cent increase in 
the social violence rates – quantified by the murder rate per 100,000. It is without a doubt 
the Venezuelan public’s number one concern244. It is understandable that the very high 
levels of social violence are a matter of grave popular concern since it affects all micro 
and macro aspects of society. It affects it in the micro level, the day to day living, as 
social violence decreases the standards of living, as people have to reduce activities of 
pleasure and business in order to reduce personal risks. At the macro level it affects the 
whole economy, as a violent market heavily increases the risks for investment. It also 
increases the risks of political pressures and instability. But just as social violence causes 
several effects on society, it is caused not by a single variable but by an interaction of 
different variables.  
 The variables that have been explained as being involved in gradually producing 
high levels of social violence are: the use of the nation’s vast oil wealth in the economy 
since the first oil boom in 1973, the short-lived structural adjustment that sought to 
reform and revive the economy after 1989, the dynamics of population growth and 
urbanization that took place in the second half of the 20th century, and lastly, the 
interaction of this variables in Venezuela’s developmental history have directly 
contributed to the nation’s socio-political crisis, which has not been able to recover itself                                                         244  International Crisis Group. “Venezuela: Accelerating the Bolivarian revolution.” Latin 
America Briefing No 22. Bogotá and Brussels. November 5. 2009. P. 6. 
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to this day, and institutionalizes the collective social resentment of the urban poor against 
the middle and upper classes. As mentioned in the introduction no hierarchy of variables 
can be suggested when explaining the phenomenon of social violence because there is a 
complex interaction of variables where each one plays a significant role. But the final 
variable, the nation’s socio-political crisis, has to be given particular emphasis because of 
its unique and very impacting role in generating social violence. This is because the 
institutionalization of social violence has been used as a mechanism to gain and maintain 
political support by channeling the collective social resentment of the people – left by the 
legacy of failed economic reforms and the urbanization dynamics – against the more 
affluent urban social spheres245. 
 Venezuela has often been mentioned in studies that deal with the management of 
natural resources and rentierism since its preconditions seem to have differed from other 
case studies, most of them in the Middle East. It possesses a liberal culture and 
democratic values rooted in western and enlightenment history. It is supposed to be the 
“exceptional case” in the study of rentier economies246. But a deeper analysis of the 
Venezuelan case reveals that superficial historical aspects do not make Venezuelan 
developmental history exceptional – in the positive sense – because the true legacy of that 
so called “exceptional case” is a precarious one that has experienced an average death toll 
                                                        245 Colburn, Forrest D. “Latin America: Captive to Commodities.” Dissent Magazine. Vol. 56 
No. 1. Winter. 2009. P. 30; Petkoff, Teodoro. “Las dos Izquierdas (The Two Lefts).” Nueva 
Sociedad. Vol. 197. May-June. 2005. P. 126 
 246 Karl, Terry L. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. University of California 
Press. Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1997. P. 21. 
  100 
of about 7,000 people each year since the 1990s due to social violence247. Arturo Uslar 
Pietri’s – unarguably Venezuela’s most important intellectual – wise advise to “seed the 
petroleum” so that it generates truly productive development instead of a developmental 
mirage that rents produce was never seriously taken248. The public industries go on to use 
oil-rents irresponsibly and do not pay attention to the massive multiplier-effect that 
generated incredibly high levels of inflation enduring to this day, which creates a 
detrimental socio-economic situation249.  
 Venezuela is no “exceptional case” so far as development is concerned. As the 
nation’s foremost critic of the rent-based development strategy, Juan Pablo Perez 
Alfonso, once claimed that his country has ceased to look like a Latin American state and 
had become “Venezuela Saudita”250. This development strategy failed in Venezuela as it 
failed in many other countries. It has generated widespread misery. The Venezuelan GDP 
per capita plunges and inequality increases at the fastest rate in Latin America251. But 
although the nation’s oil wealth can be pointed out as being one of the main causes of the 
                                                        247 Briceño-Leon, Roberto. “Violence in Venezuela: Oil Rent and Political Crisis.” Ciência & 
Saude Colectiva. Vol. 11 No. 2. April/June. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 2006. P. 319. 
 248 Mollejas, Luis Meta. Los Limites de la Revolución: Petróleo y Gobernabilidad (The Limits of 
the Revolution: Petroleum and Governability). School of Social and Economic Sciences. Central 
University of Venezuela Press. Caracas. 2006. P. 7. 249 Gelb, Alan and Associates. Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse? Published for the World Bank 
by Oxford University Press. Washington D.C. 1988. P. 321. 250 Karl, Terry L. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. University of California 
Press. Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1997. P. 73. 251 DiJohn, Jonathan. “Economic Liberalization, Political Instability, and State Capacity in 
Venezuela.” International Political Science Review. Vol. 26 No. 1. 2005. P. 107-108. 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precarious socio-economic situation, other factors had a significant role in producing the 
deteriorated state.  
Venezuela had an illiberal economic framework even before the first oil-boom. In 
Venezuela, the new democratic governments that came after 1958 followed an economic 
framework where protectionism and import substitution industrialization were the rule252. 
These illiberal, or less than liberal frameworks, allowed the Dutch Disease to rapidly 
infect the country.  
The antecedent of illiberal economic frameworks facilitated the resource curse effects 
of the Dutch Disease in Venezuela because it was composed of high import tariffs, and 
other non-tariff barriers, and international uncompetitive non-oil industries that caused a 
detrimental economic situation as shown by the country’s misery index253. The nation 
also had the pressure of population growth. In Venezuela, where the population doubled 
since the first oil-boom, the increase of the birth rate has aided in the GDP per capita 
reduction, thus increasing the negative effects of rising inflation and a reduction of the 
people’s purchasing power254. Because of the socio-economic pressures that the nation’s 
developmental history created by the late 1980s, the country was in a position where it 
had to make the hard choice of structural economic reform. 
                                                        252 Mollejas, Luis Meta. Los Limites de la Revolución: Petróleo y Gobernabilidad (The Limits of 
the Revolution: Petroleum and Governability). School of Social and Economic Sciences. Central 
University of Venezuela Press. Caracas. 2006. P. 13. 253 DiJohn, Jonathan. “Economic Liberalization, Political Instability, and State Capacity in 
Venezuela.” International Political Science Review. Vol. 26 No. 1. 2005. P. 110-111. 254 Mollejas . Los Limites de la Revolución. 2006. P. 15. 
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The year 1989 is a key historical year that forever changed the course of history 
and of the international order. Venezuela was no exception as in this year it underwent 
the changes brought by the international system and its own domestic political economy. 
In Venezuela, the socio-economic pressures for structural adjustment became too great 
not only because of the shift of the international order to a single liberal regime but 
because of the failures of the rent-based development policy and the highly detrimental 
socio-economic effects that they produced.255 It is important to note that in Venezuela, 
the shift in the international order had far less impact than in other developing nations 
that also went through the process of structural adjustment. In the Venezuelan case, a 
nation that – until the emergence of the leftist regime in 1999 – had very close and 
progressive relations with the United States, was not so much compelled to reform 
because of the influence of the new unipolar system headed by its historical ally. There is 
no evidence of any significant pressure by the American-based international financial 
institutions to press for the 1989 reforms, even though they supported them256. The 
international influence to reform in Venezuela seems much more localized since it came 
from inside the Latin American region. The architects of the Venezuelan reforms tried to 
follow the 1982 Chilean example, which took place before the shift of the international 
order from a bipolar to a unipolar regime257.  
                                                        255 DiJohn, Jonathan. “Economic Liberalization, Political Instability, and State Capacity in 
Venezuela.” International Political Science Review. Vol. 26 No. 1. 2005. P. 110. 256 DiJohn, Jonathan. “The Political Economy of Anti-Politics and Social Polarization in 
Venezuela 1998-2004.” Crisis States Research Center. Working Paper no. 76. December. 2005. 
P. 110. 
 257 Ibid, 109. 
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The liberal reforms of 1989 attempted to place Venezuela back on a path of 
growth and development by a simple readjustment of macroeconomic policies such as 
fiscal austerity (reduction of public subsidies) and trade liberalization. But the economic 
indicators did not show the positive results that were expected. In Venezuela, the 
economic indicators – with special attention to socio-economic indicators like the misery 
index – worsened, and brought the grave ills of violence and death with them. Graph 3 
will show a direct correspondence between a high misery index and violence in 
Venezuela. The quantitative data suggests that a high misery index, as a contributory 
cause for violence does not have an immediate effect but a delayed one. In the data set, 
high peaks of violence came between two to seven years after a peak of the misery index. 
In addition to the economically deterministic factors, other variables must also be 
considered.  
A very important variable that helps generate the high levels of social violence in 
Venezuela are its dynamics of population growth and urbanization. The Venezuelan 
population more than doubled since 1973258. Moreover, this population growth has to be 
seen in light of the country’s urbanization process. This process consisted of a rural-to-
urban exodus that accelerated and consolidated in the second half of the 20th century. By 
the 1980s, Venezuela had over 70 per cent of its population living in urban areas. The 
rural migrants were lured to relocate by the prospect of attaining a “modern” lifestyle and 
                                                        258 Karl, Terry L. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. University of California 
Press. Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1997. P. 4. 
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conditions in the urban settings259. Also, many of the rural migrants were affected by the 
fact that they saw other Venezuelans living in the urban settings and rapidly improving 
their living conditions. Naim and Piñango (1985), call this process the “demonstration 
effect,” as other people see the tangible results from “development”260. It is this socio-
psychological effect that worsened the social situation in the new and impoverished urban 
areas.  
The urbanization process was largely unplanned and unorganized. The subsequent 
generations of the rural migrants that were born in the urban settings did not have their 
expectations realized and in fact they saw their living standards worsen261. The fact that 
some people, especially the young ones, do not see a viable and formal alternative to 
achieve social mobility prompts them to achieve it through illegal and often violent 
means262. But even though a detrimental socio-economic equation can confidently be 
pointed out a factor that causes social violence, sociologist Briceño-Leon (1999) says that 
poverty is exaggerated as the instigator of violence. He explains that in the passage from 
                                                        259 Briceño-Leon, Roberto. “Violencia y Desesperanza: La Otra Crisis Social de America Latina 
(Violence and Hopelessness: The Other Social Crisis of Latin America).” Nueva Sociedad. 1999. 
P. 125. 260 Naim, Moises and Ramon Piñango. El Caso Venezuela: Una Ilusión de Armonia (The Case of 
Venezuela: An Illusion of Harmony). Ediciones IESA. 2nd Edition. Caracas. 1985. P. 542. 
 261 Briceño-Leon, Roberto. “Violencia y Desesperanza: La Otra Crisis Social de America Latina 
(Violence and Hopelessness: The Other Social Crisis of Latin America).” Nueva Sociedad. 1999. 
P. 128. 262 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de Sociologia. Vol 16 No 3. July-September. 2007. P. 584. 
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rural to urban life the influence of traditional institutions of social control – the family, 
the school, and religion – were severely diminished and unable to check the increasing 
tendency to violence growing amongst the youth in the impoverished urban sectors263. 
Furthermore, there are no substitute institutions of social control because the government 
withdrew from the popular urban areas264. This means that public schools, hospitals, 
churches are not being build. There is little or no presence of security forces to help curb 
the rising violence that spreads in and around the popular urban areas.  The 
impoverishment and hopelessness created by the urbanization process has become a 
source of fuel for Venezuela’s political crisis and further escalation of violence. 
In Venezuela, the full collapse of the Pactismo (pact-making) system of the Punto 
Fijo pact that followed the political crisis significantly contributed to the dramatically 
high levels of violence265. This is because this collapse, which begins in 1994 with the 
inability of the traditional parties to win the presidential election and agree on a platform 
that would address the nation’s needs, created an institutional vacuum in the country266. 
This vacuum went on to be filled in the presidential elections of 1998 by a political group                                                         263 Briceño-Leon, Roberto. “Violencia y Desesperanza.” 1999. P. 125. 264 Briceño-Leon, Roberto. “Violencia y Desesperanza: La Otra Crisis Social de America Latina 
(Violence and Hopelessness: The Other Social Crisis of Latin America).” Nueva Sociedad. 1999. 
P. 128. 265 Briceño-Leon, Roberto. “Violence in Venezuela: Oil Rent and Political Crisis.” Ciência & 
Saude Colectiva. Vol. 11 No. 2. April/June. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 2006. 
 P. 325; Mollejas, Luis Meta. Los Limites de la Revolución: Petróleo y Gobernabilidad (The 
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Sciences. Central University of Venezuela Press. Caracas. 2006. P. 16. 266 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that gained tremendous popularity amongst the popular masses by offering an 
inclusionary discourse that exploited and institutionalized their collective social 
resentment against their poor socio-economic situation267.  
Social resentment was exploited and institutionalized as a very effective political 
tool because of the popular belief by Venezuelans that they live in one of the richest, if 
not the richest, country in the world268. This belief is enhanced by the “demonstration 
effect,” where people think that their belief of living a very rich country is true. 
Therefore, a mismatch between perceptions and reality is created. This is because the 
reality for the majority of the rural migrants, especially the new generations, is one of 
poverty and unachieved expectations of development and upward social mobility269. 
Therefore, the anti-politics and anti-oligarchy rhetoric (referring to the previous 
governmental elites and the middle and upper classes) set forth by the post-1999 leftist 
regime directly resonated with the deepest feelings held by the impoverished urban 
population270. The politically volatile socio-psychological variable of social resentment – 
in combination with an impoverished urban population that had lost its institutions of 
social control is a catalyst for the rise of social violence in Venezuela. This would greatly                                                         267 Mollejas, Luis Meta. Los Limites de la Revolución: Petróleo y Gobernabilidad (The Limits of 
the Revolution: Petroleum and Governability). School of Social and Economic Sciences. Central 
University of Venezuela Press. Caracas. 2006. P. 16; DiJohn 2005b, 5. 268 Naim, Moises. “The Real Story Behind Venezuela’s Woes.” Journal of Democracy. Vol 12 
No 2. April. 2001. P. 20. 269 Briceño-Leon, Roberto. “Violencia y Desesperanza: La Otra Crisis Social de America Latina 
(Violence and Hopelessness: The Other Social Crisis of Latin America).” Nueva Sociedad. 1999. 
P. 128. 270 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aid to explain why at the turn of the millennium the already rising murder rate doubled in 
such dramatic fashion (see Graph 3).  
The analysis presented above provides a preliminary conclusion to this thesis’ 
master question and hypotheses. The following and final section will provide some 
insight into the possible solutions for Venezuela’s woes.  
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Diagram 1: The Interaction of Variables and Events that Produced Social 
Violence in Venezuela 
The interactions amongst the variables in the context of events that took place in 
Venezuela since the 1980s results in a 1000 per cent increase in social violence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable: Oil Wealth and Rent-Based 
Development 
Event: 1973 – The first oil boom, which takes place 
under an illiberal economic framework set under the 
Pactismo political system of 1958 
Event: 1980s – The oil-bust worsens even more the 
competitiveness of non-oil industries and makes the 
high levels of public expenditure and debt 
unsustainable 
 
 
 
Variable: The Urbanization 
Process and Population 
Boom 
Event: 1980s and 1990s – Rapidly 
rising levels of poverty and inequality 
alongside the destruction of 
traditional institutions of social 
control.  
 
Variable: Structural 
Adjustment of the Economy 
Event: 1989 to 1994 – Structural 
adjustment fails to revive the economy and 
the socio-economic situation worsens 
 
Variable: The Political Crisis 
Event: 1994 – The Pactismo political system collapses 
Event: 1999 till present – The personalistic regime 
begins to exploit the collective social resentment that 
arises from a mismatch between a precarious socio-
economic situation and the expectations from urban 
modernization and the nation’s oil wealth 
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1) Policy Recommendations 
“[To reverse rentierism and the resource curse] petro-states should 
simply remake themselves” 
Terry Lynn Karl, Political Scientist271. 
 Terry Lynn Karl’s (2007) notes that, “The ‘resource curse’ is primarily a political, 
and not an economic phenomenon”272. Okruhlik (1999) explains that the rentierism 
framework was sometimes inadequate to explain events in mineral states because it 
“places political choice behind economic rational”273. Therefore any policy 
recommendation to reverse rentierism and its effects of precarious socio-economic 
conditions would have to spring from the politico-economic framework. 
 Until recent years the primary policy recommendations to undo the detrimental 
socio-economic effects of the resource curse have been limited to macroeconomic 
adjustments that have been part of the early 1990s neo-classical set of structural 
adjustments. Within the structural reform package privatization was always included 
since it was seen as the means to limit the inefficient role of the public sector and 
increase productivity. But now the ill effects that rapid privatization had on emerging and 
transitioning economies have been well documented. Privatization was performed 
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University Press. New York. 256-286. 2007. P. 270. 272 Ibid, 256. 273 Okruhlik, Gwenn. “Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise of Opposition: The Political 
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without a strengthened institutional framework274. A poor strategy for privatization can 
result in a severely decreased state capacity – as is explained in the Venezuelan case 
study – that reduces the government’s ability to manage, or prevent, crisis situations 
effectively and allows the problem to worsen275. But this is not to suggest that 
privatization is undesirable. On the contrary, privatization is desirable, in the hydrocarbon 
industry and for the whole economy. This is not so much because it increases efficiency 
and productivity. Public enterprises like those in Norway have proven that a public 
enterprise can be as efficient, productive, and transparent as a private enterprise. But in 
the case of developing countries, privatization may reduce government spending on 
public works thus lowering the need for international loans. Privatization must be carried 
out against the backdrop of strengthened institutional frameworks, with special attention 
to the private property rights system276. 
 Just like privatization, previously implemented structural adjustment programs 
have tackled fiscal policy reform. Petro-states have been encouraged by these programs 
to be more fiscally responsible and transparent and to avoid rent-seeking behavior. They 
have also been encouraged to reduce the supply of circulating currency to reduce 
inflation. Even though these fiscal recommendations are economically sound they have 
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and J.E. Stiglitz. Escaping the Resource Curse. Columbia University Press. New York. 23-52. 
2007. P. 23, 27. 
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not aided in any significant way to reduce the detrimental socio-economic effects seen in 
mineral-rich economies. This is because the detrimental effects of hydrocarbon-led 
development are rooted in the political framework.  
 Simple macroeconomic adjustments to remedy a mineral economy’s woes such as 
the reduction of money supply and balancing the fiscal budget are not enough since the 
political framework has to be reformed. The way to go about this task is with socio-
political agreements. Karl (2007) proposes that all domestic and international actors abide 
by a “social fiscal contract”277. The substance of this “social fiscal contract” would be 
geared towards the prevention of rent-seeking behavior. The Kingdom of Norway was 
successful in generating such a “social fiscal contract” when it did not change its revenue 
base, income and corporate taxes, for oil rents from newly found, and massive, oil wealth 
in the 1970s. By maintaining a diversified tax-base, and bringing its plentiful oil revenues 
under strict fiscal control – as was democratically agreed with a population that has a 
direct stake in public policy through taxation – the outcome of such wise administration 
cannot be ignored. Norway now occupies the number one spot in the human development 
index278. But it must be noted that good natural resource management is not enough to 
reverse the negative effects from an ill-advised development strategy in developing 
countries that do not possess the historical and institutional preconditions of a developed 
country, which Norway possessed. Productivity of the non-oil economy has to increase to 
generate substantive and sustainable development, thus ending the vicious cycle of                                                         277 Karl, Terry L. “Ensuring Fairness: The Case for a Transparent Fiscal Social Contract.” Eds. 
Humphreys, Macartan, J.D. Sachs and J.E. Stiglitz. Escaping the Resource Curse. Columbia 
University Press. New York. 256-286. 2007. P. 257. 278 Ibid, 273. 
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rentierism279. The outcome of such a change would generate new employment 
opportunity – reducing the unemployment rate, – and that can increase the supply of 
goods so that the ratio of the amount of currency chasing the amount of goods is lowered 
– reducing the inflation rate. This would help to reduce the harmful socio-economic 
effects that provide a helping hand in generating violent outcomes. 
 Luciani’s (1987) explanation, which says that oil is not a product that is important 
in its original state, means that its importance to the exporting country comes from the 
revenues that it brings. Therefore, one can deduce that macroeconomic productivity can 
be increased – and avoid rentierism – by diversifying exports to finished products. This is 
because with a finished product would have a practical importance other than just the 
revenue that it provides280. Therefore, in order to increase productivity there has to be an 
increase in productive investment something that has been largely absent in mineral 
economies. 
 Productive investment has been historically financed by oil-rents within petro-
states. Because of the effects of the Dutch Disease oil-rents have been geared to finance 
projects within the oil industry that are geared to expand the rent-seeking industry. This 
expands industries that do not produce new productive employment opportunities or a 
reduction in the wage-hurting inflation rates. In order to generate productive investment 
from a source that other than hydrocarbon revenues – in order to avoid the detrimental 
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New York. P. 63 – 82. 1987. P. 69 280 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economic phenomena such as rentierism and the resource curse – the country’s financial 
sector must be developed281. Claessens and Leeven (2003) argue that financial 
development fosters growth at both the macroeconomic and microeconomic level282. 
They note that there is less economic growth in countries with underdeveloped financial 
sectors, as their firms do not possess adequate access to finance in order expand 
productive activities283. The authors also explain that the development of the financial 
sector is directly related to the strength and development of property rights. There is a 
direct correlation between property rights development and financial sector 
development284. This is not only because strengthened property rights reduce and may 
even prevent the possibility of arbitrary expropriation – which allows for a healthier and 
more attractive investment climate – but because they allow firms to use intangible assets 
as collateral for loans and not only tangible assets that are harder to acquire and make the 
availability of finance much more exclusive285. Only a developed property rights system 
can secure returns on intangible assets, which is what allows them to be used as 
collateral, thus expanding the access to finance286. Also, underdeveloped or poorly 
                                                        281 Kpodar, Kangni. “Why Has Unemployment in Algeria Been Higher than in MENA 
and Transition Countries?” IMF Working Paper. August. 2007. P. 21. 282 Claessens, Stijn and Luc Leeven. “Financial Development, Property Rights, and Growth.” 
The Journal of Finance. Vol. 58 No. 6. December. 2003. P. 2401. 283 Ibid, 2403. 284 Ibid, 2401. 285 Ibid, 2402. 286 Ibid, 2403. 
  114 
functioning financial institutions lead to the misallocation of resources287. Misallocation 
of resources is exactly what takes place under the effects of the resource curse and the 
Dutch Disease.  
 Political scientist, Terry Lynn Karl (2007), explains that in order for a petro state 
to reverse the outcomes of rentierism, such as the resource curse, and especially the very 
detrimental socio-economical effects of the Dutch Disease they should, 
“Diversify away from oil and use market mechanism [including a 
liberalized trade and currency exchange, privatization and deregulation] to 
guarantee macroeconomic stability. To prevent the Dutch Disease…they 
ought to improve productivity in agriculture and industry and reform their 
financial sectors. They should ‘sterilize’ their petroleum revenues by 
saving them in an oil trust fund abroad, thereby avoiding overheating by 
introducing them gradually into the economy. They should cut public 
spending and avoid popular public works programs with immediate 
payoffs. Finally they should provide a stable environment for property 
rights [so that access to finance and productive investment can occur] and 
drastically limit their own role, possibly by privatizing the petroleum 
industry [but after basic state institutions have been strengthened]. And 
they should do all of this while improving their judicial system to better 
fight corruption. In short, petro-states should simply remake themselves. 
                                                        287 Claessens, Stijn and Luc Leeven. “Financial Development, Property Rights, and Growth.” 
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But such prescriptions do not take into account the fundamental reality: 
what is often economically inefficient decision making is an integral part 
of the calculation of rulers to retain their political support by distributing 
petrodollars to their friends, allies, and social support bases” (emphasis 
in original)288. 
Karl is able to synthesize all of the policy recommendations that have been put forward 
by almost all of the experts in the field of rentier political economy. She is also able to 
point out the fundamentally important challenge that sovereignty places on switching to a 
more efficient, productive and sustainable developmental path where socio-political 
violence can be avoided. The exclusion of traditional elites in Venezuela is an example of 
Karl’s final point.  
One important conclusion that can be drawn from analysis of the Venezuelan case 
is the danger of destroying or excluding traditional elites. The Venezuelan case exhibits 
severe effects from the exclusion or destruction of traditional elites as it occurred twice 
during the country’s history. The first time was during the early 19th century after 
independence was achieved. The traditional Spanish and Criollos (Venezuelan-born 
Spaniards) elites and their institutional frameworks were destroyed by a bloody 
independence war that killed 40 per cent of the country’s contemporary population. This 
prompted the rise of authoritarian regimes because of the havoc left by the absence of an 
                                                        288 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established governmental institutional infrastructure289. In 2002, the second episode 
occurred where traditional elites were destroyed or excluded. The traditional elites 
working in the oil industry, and other public institutions entered into a two-month long 
general strike that failed to meet its goals of forcing the president to resign and to call for 
new presidential elections. After the regime emerged victorious it proceeded to fire and 
exclude from all public enterprises all of the 18,000 professionals, which were part of the 
traditional elites, which took part in the general strike290. Graph 4 is able to show that 
after the “lockout” of the traditional elites, the Venezuelan annual GDP growth plunged 
to negative 8.9 and remained around that low level for about two years. Thus severely 
affecting productivity and worsening the socio-economic situation. The latter episode of 
exclusion of the traditional elites constitutes part of Venezuela’s political crisis. 
This conclusion has given particular emphasis to possible remedies to the 
economic woes of Venezuela, which are directly linked to the economies oil dependence. 
Policy recommendations for the country’s social and political woes are much more 
complicated. This is because problems such as the political crisis and urbanization have 
developed over several decades. Therefore, their remedies will also have to take a 
significant amount of time to have the desired effect. In relation to the urbanization 
process, it is clear that an economic recovery will not suffice, as the institutions of social                                                         289 Karl, Terry L. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. University of California 
Press. Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1997. P. 74-75. 290 Mollejas, Luis Meta. Los Limites de la Revolución: Petróleo y Gobernabilidad (The Limits of 
the Revolution: Petroleum and Governability). School of Social and Economic Sciences. Central 
University of Venezuela Press. Caracas. 2006. P. 17; Mähler, Annegret. “Oil In Venezuela: 
Triggering Violence or Ensuring Stability? A Context-sensitive Analysis of Ambivalent Impact 
of Resource Abundance.” German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA). Working Papers 
no 112. October. 2009. P. 26. 
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control have to be replaced or regenerated so that the violent culture or the propensity for 
violence, especially amongst the youth, can be significantly reduced291. The political 
crisis will be resolved when the current populist and personalistic regime ends and is 
replaced by organized political institutions292. It is clear that Venezuela’s social and 
political woes have contributed to the rise of social violence and will necessitate ample 
time to be resolved. This conclusion may seem pessimistic about the future possibility of 
positive developments taking place in the more immediate future. But there may still be 
hope. 
 Most often the Kingdom of Norway is the exemplary country that is put forward 
as the one that has, from the beginning, avoided rentierism and its detrimental socio-
economic effects. But it is acknowledged by those who use the example of Norway that it 
is a country whose initial preconditions are very different from other mineral economies 
as it was a developed country with a strong institutional system before the exploitation of 
mineral endowments in the 1970s. This differs from the common experience of 
developing countries that have tried to develop after the exploitation of mineral wealth, 
with catastrophic results293. Moises Naim (2009) provides successful examples of 
developing mineral economies – although they are mineral economies they are not petro-
states. Naim asserts that the mineral countries of Chile and Botswana have both avoided                                                         291 Briceño-Leon, Roberto. “Violencia y Desesperanza: La Otra Crisis Social de America Latina 
(Violence and Hopelessness: The Other Social Crisis of Latin America).” Nueva Sociedad. 1999. 
P. 131. 292 DiJohn, Jonathan. “The Political Economy of Anti-Politics and Social Polarization in 
Venezuela 1998-2004.” Crisis States Research Center. Working Paper no. 76. December. 2005. 
P. 1. 
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rentierism and the resource curse. He goes on to explain that, “Their experiences confirm 
what we know is needed to inoculate a country from the oil curse. But why they were 
able to do so is still a mystery. Answers such as ‘good leadership,’ ‘strong governance,’ 
and ‘reliable institutions’ only serve to mask our ignorance. Unlocking the secret of what 
enabled these two poor countries to successfully lift the resource curse can spare millions 
from the devil's excrement. But nobody has done it yet”294.  
 Moises Naim’s suggestion that successful experiences in developing mineral 
economies should be given much closer study to analyze and compare the causes, and 
preconditions, of positive outcomes and if they are compatible with the preconditions and 
current situation of countries such as Venezuela. It is also important to note that this 
present study has focused on a politico-economic analysis linked to the developmental 
strategies and history of the Venezuelan case in order to bring about a possible 
explanation for the appearance of high socio-political violence. This study does not 
include other technical factors such as the availability and effectiveness of police forces 
and of the criminal judicial system. These are factors that also ought to be analyzed. The 
causes of high socio-political violence are definitely a multi-variable phenomenon. Thus, 
the reversal of Venezuela’s social violence and its other woes will have to be 
comprehensive of all of its different causes so that real and positive development can be 
achieved.                                                         294 Naim, Moises. “The Devil’s Excrement: Can Oil-Rich Countries Avoid the Resource Curse?” 
Foreign Policy. September/October. 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/08/17/the_devil_s_excrement (Accessed on 
September 19, 2009). 2009. 
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Appendix A 
“It has been said this week in Venezuela that this is not a country without security, but it 
is a country in which we live a ‘sensation’ of insecurity. Everyone has attacked the author 
of the phrase, without realizing that the postulate is a transcendental concept that even is 
philosophically impeccable. To me, this stuff takes us back to Kant, the German 
philosopher, who understood the concept of sensation as ‘the effect over the 
representative faculty, as far as we are affected by it.’ 
Who can assure the more than 59 people that died last week in Caracas that they are truly 
dead? Do we have the capacity of involve ourselves in spiritual insights? Probably, Kant 
and his Ombudsman would say that ‘the object’, the lead bullet, produced over “the 
representative faculty” of the victim the ‘sensation. of dying. The only difference with 
other vitals sensations is that this will be a lasting and definitive sensation, but that takes 
nothing away from it. 
Probably the relatives have the sensation that they buried him and the morgues the 
sensation that they collapsed…I will go even further; Do you, dear reader ever have a 
feeling that we only have a sensation of Government, that this shit can not be happening? 
Have you ever thought when oil prices go up beyond one hundred dollars and you keep 
contemplating the same poverty, that what we have here is a sensation of wealth? When 
you hear the corresponding Minister saying that he is going to end with the workers and 
that he will lessen their working conditions imposed by the –employee-Government, that 
what we have here is a sensation of socialism? Don’t you have the sensation that here 
what they are doing is ripping off the money shamelessly? With what happened in 
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Curiepe don’t you get the feeling that people are getting pissed and that the ‘people’ have 
the sensation that they are being screwed and that is why they are going to shut down 
radio stations so that people do not have the sensation that they have sensations? To me, 
by now, I have no doubt; Venezuela is a country, which is: Sensational!”295 
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